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THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
By Julian Arato*

ABSTRACT
This Article argues that investment treaties subtly constrain how nations organize their
internal systems of private law, including laws of property, contracts, corporations, and intellectual property. Problematically, the treaties do so on a one-size-ﬁts-all basis, disregarding the
wide variation in values reﬂected in these domestic legal institutions. Investor-state dispute settlement exacerbates this tension, further distorting national private law arrangements. This
hidden aspect of the system produces inefﬁciency, unfairness, and distributional inequities
that have eluded the regime’s critics and apologists alike.

I. INTRODUCTION
International investment law (IIL) goes further in disciplining states’ internal policy space
than is commonly realized. The point has been made time and again that IIL restricts states’
capacity to regulate in the public interest. While this critique is sometimes overstated, it is
clear that investment treaties do constrain national regulatory autonomy regarding foreign
property to a degree. But what is generally missed is an altogether different way in which
IIL disciplines the state’s internal legal architecture. I argue that investment treaties subtly,
but signiﬁcantly, constrain how nations organize and balance their internal systems of private
law vis-à-vis foreigners—not only with respect to property rights, but also extending to laws of
contracts, intellectual property, and corporations. Problematically, however, they tend to do
so on a rigid, one-size-ﬁts-all basis, without regard to the wide variation in values reﬂected in
these discrete private law institutions. Moreover, these constraints have been inﬂated, irregularly and inconsistently, through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) case law. Put
another way, IIL and ISDS together haphazardly discipline domestic private law policy
space, with overlooked consequences for both private and public interests. This hidden aspect
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of the investment treaty regime produces discrete doctrinal, conceptual, and distributional
problems, which are insufﬁciently understood—by critics and apologists of the system alike.
This Article draws out the private law dimension of IIL as a new frame for understanding
the system’s promise and pitfalls. IIL has effectively, if unintentionally, created far-reaching
swathes of international private law1 across diverse ﬁelds—through a dynamic combination
of treaty-making by states and interpretation by international arbitrators. Not only does IIL
thereby displace particular rules of national private law. Much more seriously, it distorts the
logic and functions of core private law institutions—for example by undermining party
choice in contracts, and the separate legal personality of corporations.
I make two main claims: one conceptual and one critical. First, I argue that IIL has emerged
as a broad, amorphous ﬁeld of international private law. This development has turned on a
common but subtle problem of treaty drafting. Investment treaties typically lay out broad
deﬁnitions of investment, covering not only standard forms of property, but also “assets of
any kind.” By extending their protections to property, contracts, intellectual property, enterprises, and stocks and shares, investment treaties create international private law in relation to
each—incompletely, to be sure, but meaningfully disciplining national private law nevertheless. Yet these treaties rarely differentiate as to how their substantive and procedural protections apply to the varied assets they cover. As a result, ISDS tribunals have been left to
determine the scope of international property, contract, intellectual property, and corporate
law that investment treaties impose—and thus how far IIL displaces domestic private law
institutions and values. This they have done expansively, though mostly implicitly.
Second, and more troublingly, I argue that the patterns of interpretation are distorting
foundational principles of national private law. The impact is most obvious on relationships
between states and foreign investors—but these trends have spillovers for other actors as well.
Based on questionable interpretive assumptions, the ISDS case law is producing looming
inefﬁciency and unfairness for investors, host states, home states, and third parties.
The transformation of IIL into a broad regime of international private law has been a quiet
metamorphosis. Prior to the 1970s, foreign investment was largely regulated by a thin regime
of customary international law. Custom imposed duties of non-discrimination and arguably
rules concerning expropriation and due process (denial of justice).2 These norms were understood to apply to real and personal property, classically understood, and only in very limited
form to contracts.3 However, in the 1980s and 1990s, states largely supplanted the customary
regime with a network of thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). As is well known,

1
I avoid the phrase “private international law”—a term of art mainly encompassing rules regulating conﬂicts of
law and jurisdiction. While not technically inapposite, it does not usually refer to substantive private law (which is
largely left to domestic law). To avoid confusion, I use the anodyne expression “international private law” to connote those international legal rules imposing primary substantive and procedural rules of private law on states (and
others), regulating property rights, contracts, intellectual property, corporate governance, and so forth. This
Article takes no hard stance on whether these rules are better understood as “private international law” or “public
international law.”
2
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 611–14 (8th ed. 2012).
3
See GA Res. 1803 (XVII), “Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,” Art. 8 (Dec. 14, 1962)
(“Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign states shall be observed in good
faith.”).

2019

THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

3

these treaties codiﬁed and expanded the international standards of treatment due to foreign
investors, and empowered investors to directly sue host states via ISDS. Less understood is
that investment treaties almost invariably (1) extend their substantive protections to assets of
any kind, without (2) drawing any distinctions as to how their provisions relate to such varied
commercial legal relationships. The harm in this under-speciﬁcation would only emerge in
the 2000s, as ISDS exploded in popularity among investors. Concrete cases forced tribunals
to determine the relationship between substantive and procedural treaty standards and the
broad array of covered investments. But the case law has tended to skate over these questions
uncritically, without sensitivity to the wide variety of interests and values at stake. Taken
together, through meandering waves of treaty making and interpretation over half a century,
IIL has established an invasive ﬁeld of international private law sub rosa—one whose contours
remain fuzzy and unpredictable, often frustrating the very values that investment treaties are
designed to promote.
This Article reassesses ISDS jurisprudence from a private law perspective. For the most
part, tribunals have broadly and homogeneously applied IIL to all forms of private legal assets.
As a result, ISDS has effectively expanded the scope of IIL as a system of international private
law, imposing obligations on states regarding the disposition of property, contracts, enterprises, stocks and shares, and intellectual property—all with very little differentiation.
Moreover, tribunals rarely consider these matters head on, tending instead to base their
reasoning on implicit property-oriented assumptions (or, more recently, assumptions
about the level of deference due to states’ public regulatory decisions). The effect is not
only to displace particular private law rules, but to distort the varied functions of whole ﬁelds
of national private law in relations between states and foreign investors.
Investment treaties are clearly designed to protect foreign-owned real and personal property from uncompensated takings, discrimination, and unfair treatment more generally. For
the most part, in so doing, IIL reﬂects the basic structure of property protection found in
domestic law—at least in market economies. True, ISDS tribunals have tended to gravitate
toward an absolutist “Blackstonian” conception of property, while national jurisdictions tend
to exhibit more ﬂexibility, treating property rights as variable “bundles of sticks.”4 Domestic
property rights are neither absolute, nor equivalent from form to form—let alone country to
country—and nations prioritize widely different values in their property institutions. To the
extent that IIL requires enhancing these bundles in relation to foreign investors, it can supplement or displace particular national property rules and encroach on the values they embody.
Still, the investment treaty regime has not fundamentally distorted how property is protected,
leaving the basic animating logic and functions of national property law intact.
Deeper category problems emerge where tribunals consider non-property assets. ISDS
tends to resolve such cases in much the same way as property disputes, and with much the
same vocabulary. Though subtle, this tendency produces serious normative problems, and it
is here that the private law framework I advance has its greatest critical payoff.
Contracts provide the most vivid case. The essence of contract is choice—a logic of customization that contrasts with property’s logic of standardization. However, ISDS tribunals
implicitly, but routinely, interpret investment treaties as generating wide sets of rigid implied
terms applicable to contracts between foreign investors and host states or state-owned entities.
4

Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. J. INT’L L. 229, 260 (2015).
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Tribunals almost always cast treaty rights as hard property-style rules, with the effect of precluding parties’ contractual choices on matters ranging from substantive duties to excuse,
forum selection, and the measure of damages. In contract terminology, tribunals tend to
apply treaty rules on all these matters as mandatory terms—or very sticky defaults. This
approach turns the logic of contract on its head. In particular cases, it entails effectively rewriting the contractual bargain ex post. This possibility, in turn, constrains states’ and investors’
capacity to efﬁciently bargain over risk and price ex ante, and may dampen their appetite to
contract altogether.5 ISDS has also distorted the regulatory functions of contract law in other
ways. For example, some tribunals have interpreted IIL as dictating rules on the valid modes
of contract formation, thereby requiring states to enforce contracts which would have been
invalid ab initio on public policy grounds.6 By uncritically and rigidly extending treaty protections to contracts, ISDS tribunals have tended to distort the basic logic of domestic contract law, with unfortunate policy consequences for the very investment-promotion goals that
IIL seeks to achieve.
A similar dynamic plays out in the extension of IIL to corporate law. Treaty coverage of
both “enterprises” and “stocks and shares” creates jarring ambiguities from a corporate law
perspective. For example, BITs generally leave unclear what kinds of claims an investor-shareholder may bring. Tribunals typically assume that investors may bring shareholder claims for
losses suffered by the corporation, to vindicate their stocks and shares as covered assets.7 This
deceptively mundane interpretation erects a rule of international corporate law that cuts
against the universal national law presumption that shareholders may not bring claims for
indirect diminution in share value caused by third party harm to the ﬁrm (except via shareholder derivative suits). Yet ISDS tribunals have displaced this foundational rule uncritically,
without any consideration of the strong policies behind the domestic approach, which carefully balances the interests and expectations of the ﬁrm, corporate insiders (shareholders and
management), and outsiders (creditors and the general public).8 The ISDS approach has perverse effects for all concerned, simultaneously subjecting states to multiple claims by the ﬁrm,
its shareholders, and even indirect owners, while allowing some shareholders to subordinate
the rights and interests of other owners, creditors, and management. Tribunals have also
muddied foundational questions of corporate agency and authority. For example, in
Getma v. Guinea, the tribunal substituted its own ex post assessment of apparent authority
for any analysis of the applicable law—an approach that would, ex ante, destabilize the
rules of engagement with ﬁrms and their agents in the context of foreign direct investment.9
In all these cases, ISDS and IIL have displaced key features of domestic corporate law, though
only implicitly and without adequate analysis of the tradeoffs, unjustiﬁably and inefﬁciently

5

See Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV 351 (2016).
See, e.g., Bankswitch v. Ghana, UNCITRAL Award (except for costs) (2014) [hereinafter Bankswitch].
7
See, e.g., CMS Gas v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Jurisdiction, para. 65 (July 17, 2003).
8
See David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims for Reﬂective Loss: Insights from Advanced
Systems of Corporate Law (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2014/02, July 23, 2014), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvgngmr3-en; Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reﬂective Loss: How
International Investment Law Changes Corporate Law and Governance, 40 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018).
9
See Getma v. Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29, Décision sur la Compétence, para. 17 (Dec. 29, 2012)
(Fr.) [hereinafter Getma].
6
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distorting core characteristics and functions of the corporate form—from separate legal personality to delegated management.
By contrast, tribunals have thus far tended to fare better in the few cases involving
intellectual property claims. Unlike property, contracts, and corporate law, there is an independent and robust ﬁeld of international intellectual property law. As the breadth of IIL and
ISDS came into focus, some scholars raised alarms that ISDS could be used to subvert both
national and international intellectual property arrangements.10 However, in the few intellectual property cases that have arisen—all very recent—tribunals have proven more sensitive to
the nuances of patents and trademarks, as distinct from real property and other assets. For
example, in Philip Morris v. Uruguay the tribunal resisted efforts to cast trademarks in
Blackstonian property terms, ﬁnding that, unlike with real and personal property, the applicable national and international intellectual property rules endow trademarks with only a right
of exclusion, not use rights. In other words, a trademark holder may prevent others from using
her mark, but has no separate right to actually use the mark herself—if, for example, the state
seeks to limit advertising on tobacco products. Intellectual property is by no means immunized against distortion in the future. But at least the few patent and trademark cases decided
thus far suggest a better path toward grappling with the private dimensions of IIL.
In each of these ﬁelds, IIL and ISDS are creating new international private law. The seeds
lie in the under-speciﬁed drafting of investment treaties, which extend broad substantive and
procedural protections to a wide range of assets without explaining how these provisions apply
to the very different categories of covered investments. ISDS tribunals have tended to assume
that treaty norms apply to all covered assets in much the same way. In so doing, they functionally transform IIL into a broad and rigid regime of international private law, constraining
states’ ﬂexibility in articulating their internal private law systems—both with respect to choosing which values to enshrine, and how to balance the relevant tradeoffs. In other words, IIL
and ISDS not only discipline states’ public regulatory policy space; they also constrain (and
distort) how states design their private law institutions—with distinct distributional consequences and implications for societal values.
These problems give rise to two further glaring questions: Why have IIL’s private law consequences gone mostly unnoticed? And to what extent may states’ ongoing reform efforts nevertheless address these pathologies? Though not encouraging, the answers turn out to be
related.
The rising skepticism of IIL must be understood in light of broader trends in economic
globalization. As Poulsen explains, developed states were only able to get BIT programs off
the ground in the 1980s and 1990s, as neoliberalism ascended in international economic law
and policy more generally.11 Thus, the transformative deepening of IIL occurred alongside a
10
Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557 (2015); James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime
Shift of IP Law Making and Enforcement from the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J. L.
SCI. & TECH. 427 (2017); Peter K. Yu, Cross Fertilizing ISDS with TRIPS, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (2017);
Kathleen Liddell & Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions, 19 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 145 (2016).
11
LAUGE POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 2 (2016); Kenneth Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 211–13 (1988).
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more general turn to deep integration strategies among developed and developing states alike
in trade, ﬁnance, and development policy, all against the backdrop of Washington Consensus
ideas.12 The backlash against IIL and ISDS in the late 2000s should also be understood in
connection with a broader waning of neoliberal ideology—even in mainstream economics.13
Here, the particular spark was a series of vivid awards against Argentina arising out of measures taken by that state to weather its ﬁnancial crisis of 2001–2002. From the beginning, the
backlash against IIL and ISDS was heavily inﬂuenced by an important, but contingent, intuition that investment treaties unduly constrain national regulatory autonomy—with the
dominant scholarly critique oriented around reconceiving IIL in public law terms.14
Though highly successful, this line of attack has been overly focused on the general balance
between regulatory sovereignty and investor protection.15 The outsized inﬂuence of these
concerns has tended to obscure pathologies in how IIL and ISDS regulate private law—
both at the treaty level and within the jurisprudence.
This dynamic also helps explain why recent treaty reform projects have been practically
blind to the private dimensions of IIL. Based in large part on perceived imbalances between
investor protections and regulatory autonomy, both developed and developing states have
embarked on a range of efforts to reform investment treaties—substantively16 and institutionally.17 Laudable as these reforms may be, they have mostly continued to treat the varied
assets covered by investment treaties as an undifferentiated mass. The overemphasis on the
public law frame has thus allowed a wide range of private law problems to continue unmitigated, and has arguably even contributed to them. Differently designed, IIL could serve as a
complement to national private law—one that respects the logic of its various ﬁelds as well as
the varied policy choices nations make in constructing their discrete private law regimes. But

12

DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE (2017). A parallel, though less thoroughgoing, development has
occurred in human rights law with respect to the right to property. See José Alvarez, The Human Right of
Property, 72 MIAMI L. REV. 580 (2018); Arato, supra note 4.
13
See, e.g., THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2017);
DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX (2012); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
REVISITED (2017); See also Robert Howse, Economics for Progressive International Lawyers, 5 LONDON REV. INT’L
L. 187 (2017).
14
See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest: The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010); William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283
(2010); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); but see José Alvarez, Is
Investor-State Arbitration Public?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 534 (2016).
15
Not all proponents of the “public law” school of thought deploy the frame in such a totalizing manner. See,
for example, the more even-handed work of Stephan Schill and Robert Howse.
16
For example, clarifying and/or limiting the scope of treaty protections, or incorporating general exceptions
provisions.
17
For example, via mechanisms for greater control over interpretation, or reworking ISDS. See Sergio Puig &
Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AJIL 361
(2018); Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AJIL
410 (2018); Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION (H.R. Fabri ed., 2017).
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this requires a substantial shift in how we think about investment treaties—not only vis-à-vis
interpretation, but, most importantly, at the treaty-making stage.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II lays out the private law theory of IIL in broad
conceptual terms and situates it alongside the public law approach. Part III then advances a
critique of the jurisprudence from a private law perspective. The lion’s share of the Article,
this Part traces how IIL and ISDS displace and distort national private law across four ﬁelds:
(A) property; (B) contracts; (C) corporations; and (D) intellectual property. Part IV concludes
by laying the groundwork for a refocused project of reform, oriented primarily toward treaty
design.
II. THE PRIVATE LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
The international law of foreign direct investment regulates state conduct behind the border, by affording special protections to foreign private investors. Investment treaties have two
linked goals: to protect foreign investors from certain forms of state action ex post, in order to
promote foreign direct investment ex ante.18 The evident tradeoff is that such commitments
discipline future state action, restricting the state’s freedom within its internal domain. An
ideal IIL regime would be calibrated to encourage maximally efﬁcient investment while disciplining the state to the minimal extent possible. But such commitments will always prove
messy and uncertain in practice. What is important to understand at the outset is that trading
off discipline and freedom is a central function of IIL. The real questions are what kinds of
disciplines it sets up, what it constrains, and what incentives it produces.
The prevailing view in policy and scholarly circles is that the balance in IIL is off, with
the costs of its disciplines outstripping any potential gains in encouraging foreign direct
investment.19 From a national regulatory perspective, IIL has come under ﬁre for undercutting the state’s internal sovereign prerogatives, democratic choice, and self-determination.
The concern is that the regime has empowered private investors to collaterally attack all
kinds of sovereign regulatory measures, through compulsory, binding, and highly enforceable
ISDS arbitration. Further, the sheer volume of investment treaties and arbitral awards has
contributed to legal fragmentation and uncertainty. Ad hoc ISDS awards have created signiﬁcant interpretive inconsistencies, without any institutional mechanism for appeal, review, or
harmonization.20 These are real concerns, even if occasionally overblown. Even in its best
light, this regime at least threatens national regulatory autonomy.

18

See Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory
Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507 (2009); JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE POULSEN & MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME (2017).
19
See, e.g., MICHAEL WAIBEL, ASHA KAUSHAL, KYO-HWA CHUNG & CLAIRE BALCHIN, THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (2010); BONNITCHA, POULSEN & WAIBEL, supra note 18;
UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement), Thirty-Fifth Sess.,
UN Doc A/CN.9/935 (April 23–27, 2018) [hereinafter UNCITRAL WGIII Report, 35th Sess.] (compiling government concerns about procedural and structural problems with ISDS).
20
UNCITRAL WGIII Report, 35th Sess., supra note 19, at paras. 20–38.
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The investment treaty regime is at an inﬂection point. While very few states have moved
toward total exit, very few accept the status quo.21 States of all stripes have embarked on
signiﬁcant projects of reform—unilateral,22 bilateral,23 and multilateral.24
The emerging conventional wisdom among reformers holds that IIL must be recast as a
system of public law—to better capture its pressure on national regulatory policy. Scholars
writing in this vein view the “public law frame” as key to securing national sovereignty and
democratic choice, supposing that the language, doctrines, and institutions of public law will
be more sensitive to cherished public values.25 This turn to public law has not been free of
controversy, and important voices remain unconvinced.26 But it has clearly reshaped the
debate, with states adopting the rhetoric of public law in advocating for reform.27
Yet for all this attention, the meaning and consequences of IIL remain poorly understood.
Its doctrinal workings are, of course, expounded in countless treatises, monographs, and
articles.28 And the basic tension between investor protection and regulatory values is now
well-known—thanks to the important contributions of the “public law school” of thought.
But for all the pages written on BITs and ISDS, there has been very little theoretical consideration of the core private dimensions of a regime established for the protection of foreign
property. As a result, major problems of fairness, efﬁciency, and equitable distribution
have been missed. The private law account advanced here seeks to address this lacuna.
For all its signiﬁcant implications for domestic public law and public values, IIL is at heart
about regulating investments—which means property (real, personal, and intellectual), contracts, enterprises, and all sorts of equity interests in local business organizations. The main
thing that investment treaties do is establish international law and institutions to discipline
how states govern the private rights and interests of foreigners internally. In other words, IIL
and ISDS regulate domestic private law. The goal, here, is to reexamine the investment treaty

21
Puig & Shaffer, supra note 17, at n. 31 (discussing withdrawals from ICSID by Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela, and attempts by the latter two to exit numerous BITs). South Africa has also suspended negotiation
of new investment treaties. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework
Review: Government Position Paper 12, 12 (2009), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/ﬁles/docs/
090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf.
22
See, e.g., 2016 Indian Model BIT, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/3560; 2018 Netherlands Draft Model BIT, available at https://globalarbitrationreview.com/digital_assets/820bcdd9-08b5-4bb5-a81e-d69e6c6735ce/Draft-Model-BIT-NL-2018.pdf; 2012 U.S. Model BIT,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
23
See, e.g., EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter; Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPaciﬁc Partnership (CPTPP), available at http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/09.aspx?lang=eng.
24
UNCITRAL WGIII Report, 35th Sess., supra note 19 (on reforming ISDS multilaterally).
25
See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 14; Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 14; Kingsbury & Schill supra
note 14; Howse, supra note 17.
26
Alvarez, supra note 14.
27
See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of ISDS, Submission from the EU, at 2–3, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/
WP.145 (Dec. 12, 2017), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/088/32/PDF/
V1708832.pdf?OpenElement.
28
See, e.g., RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2d ed.
2012); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (2009).

2019

THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

9

regime from a private law perspective—both on its own terms, and in how it interacts with
private law at the national level.
A. International Investment Law as International Private Law
As categories, public and private law should not be segregated too neatly. The classical division understands public law as the law regulating interactions between individuals and the
state (or other public authorities), and private law as that regulating relationships between
private individuals. As has long been clear, however, these categories do not connote entirely
distinct ﬁelds of law.29 Wide areas of so-called private law regulate interactions between individuals and the state, such as takings law, the law of public contracts, and the regulation of
corporations (including mandatory disclosures to regulators and capitalization requirements).
Indeed, entire ﬁelds of law arguably live in the boundary, such as the law of patents.30
Moreover, the state often acts as a commercial party in all kinds of private legal arrangements,
from buying and selling property, to contracting with citizens and foreigners, to investing in
private business organizations, joint ventures, and state-owned enterprises. IIL disciplines
state action in exactly this border zone.31 As such, it can be usefully and differently understood through both public and private law frames—both in terms of how far it accomplishes
its goals of investment protection and promotion, and in terms of how it affects domestic legal
institutions.
The claim, here, is that, whatever else it does, IIL creates surprisingly broad swathes of
international private law. In extending their broad, open-textured standards of treatment
to “assets of any kind,” investment treaties effectively set out international legal rules to govern property, contracts, corporate law, intellectual property, and many other private legal
rights and interests. Their breadth has been further expanded and hardened through ISDS
case law, touching on matters from: the scope and content of property rights; to the making,
breaking, and content of contracts; to the contours of the corporate form. These rules materially affect the meaning of such covered private rights and interests, even if the latter originate
in the national legal order. Private investors and states should factor them in ex ante in constructing their commercial relationships, and they will have a strong bearing on how alleged
harms are compensated ex post. As a consequence, IIL also strongly affects the range of choices
available to the state in how it regulates through internal private law.
To be clear, I do not seek to replace an essentializing public law theory with an equally
dogmatic private one.32 As a semantic matter, it is not especially important that IIL is
described as either public law or private law, or as some kind of hybrid. What matters is
29
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, VOL. II, at 641 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). This does
not mean that public and private law are necessarily completely interchangeable categories. On the speciﬁcity of
private law, see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016) (conceiving of private law as the law of relationships, establishing frameworks for interactions between free and equal
persons).
30
See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After
Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315 (2004).
31
A few scholars have similarly characterized the regime as a hybrid between public and private law. See Alvarez,
supra note 14; Anthea Roberts, Clash of the Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System,
107 AJIL 45, 45 (2013).
32
See, mutatis mutandis, MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 125 (Talcott
Parsons trans., 2005)
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where we focus in evaluating the regime. I deploy the concepts of public and private law here
as ideal types—as analytical categories, the purpose of which is not classiﬁcation in and of
itself, but rather achieving a better understanding of the pressures and values implicated by
regulating commercial interactions between private individuals and the state.33 The private
and public law frames serve to draw attention to the different facets involved. And there can be
value in overlap, where these frames reveal discrete pathologies, and point to different pathways for reform.
Framing IIL in private law terms reveals tensions and pathologies on both sides of the
tradeoff between the state’s regulatory capacity and protecting investors to induce foreign
direct investment. On the one hand, it illuminates how IIL constrains and distorts regulatory
choices across a wide, and underappreciated, range of private legal ﬁelds. On the other hand,
from this vantage point IIL and ISDS appear to work against the predictability and stability
central to IIL’s investment promotion goals. Yet, none of this is necessarily implied by the
treaties as drafted. A more theoretically satisfying private law approach opens the way to better
calibrating the wide range of relationships, interests, and values implicated by IIL and ISDS—
with payoffs for interpreting extant treaties, and, more importantly, for future treaty design.
B. International Investment Law and National Private Law
The relationship between IIL and national private law has been mostly missed. Shifting
focus, here, brings to light an underappreciated constriction of the state’s regulatory policy
space—one that has already proven more invasive than IIL’s much feared strangulation of the
state’s ability to regulate health and environmental matters. Before turning to the jurisprudence, it is worth pausing to clarify terms. IIL relates to national law in three discrete, but
partially overlapping ways. First, in a general sense, it disciplines the state, limiting its freedom
as a matter of international law. Second, this can entail formally displacing national legal rules.
Third, IIL can materially distort national law in a deeper functional sense—upsetting the logic
of whole ﬁelds of private law.
IIL is clearly meant to discipline domestic law at the international level. Indeed, commitment is the investment treaty’s core function—a legal promise by the state to refrain from
certain actions with respect to foreigners in the hopes of attracting foreign direct investment.
Such promises invariably include forbearance from arbitrary and discriminatory action, and
generally some broader protections against losses associated with regulation. And ISDS gives
these commitments teeth. Thus discipline, here, connotes international legal commitment in
the most general sense—the state agrees to act (or not act) in certain ways, and can be held to
account for failing to do so through compulsory arbitration and potentially large monetary
awards.
But what happens where such disciplines prohibit acts authorized or required by national
law—for example, by affording foreign investors more robust takings protections than would
33

WEBER, supra note 29, at 3–24 (on ideal types) and 641–44 (on public and private law as ideal types). Each
type may have some elective afﬁnity toward certain legal doctrines or institutions, but merely afﬁxing one label or
the other to a borderline case should not lead mechanically to conclusions about how that case should be resolved.
As Dewey notes, abstract descriptions of what a legal entity is tells us nothing about how it ought to be regulated,
and may indeed mask the key tradeoffs. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 670–73 (1926).
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be available domestically? Certainly, investment treaties purport to take priority over conﬂicting national law. But the relationship is only deceptively simple.
At least in the context of ISDS, IIL formally displaces conﬂicting national legal rules. It is a
basic principle that internal law cannot excuse the violation of an international legal obligation.34 This does not mean, however, that the latter invalidates the former. Absent a special
relationship of direct effect, the national law will remain in place unless the state removes the
conﬂict internally.35 But the state will be liable for any breach of the international obligation
as a matter of international law. What makes IIL distinctive is that private individuals can
enforce their international legal rights directly through ISDS, where IIL obligations take priority over conﬂicting national law. Taken together, IIL and ISDS thus meaningfully displace
conﬂicting national legal rules at the international level. Furthermore, ISDS is highly enforceable, keying into multilateral treaties for enforcing arbitral awards across the globe.36 Thus, ex
ante, states and investors should understand IIL as creating justiciable and enforceable rules of
substantive private law that supersede national law, and they should price its rules and institutions into any investments accordingly.
That international legal rules displace domestic law is not surprising in and of itself. What
comes as a surprise is the sheer breadth of private legal rules arbitrators have read into brief,
laconic investment treaties. As explored in the next Part, in applying a handful of standards
relating to expropriation and fair and equitable treatment to an expansive range of covered
investments, ISDS tribunals have read the treaties to displace a staggering range of national
private law rules: from the scope of property rights; to the making, performance, and breaking
of contracts; to the relations among corporate constituencies, including particularly the procedural rights of shareholders, and rules of agency and authority.
Moreover, IIL and ISDS distort fundamental principles of national private law. By this I
mean something less formal than displacement, but more normatively charged. A rule of
international law distorts national law when it interferes with the broader logic and functions
of the domestic legal system. For example, a strong international expropriation standard will
displace weaker domestic takings protections, without necessarily distorting national property
law. But it is also possible that displacing certain keystone rules and principles can undercut
the broader functions of property law—for example by blurring the foundational principle
ﬁxing the number and content of recognized property forms.
To the extent that investment treaties apply substantive and procedural rules to real and
personal property, contracts, intellectual property, enterprises, stocks and shares, they create
rules of international private law in each ﬁeld. Naturally such rules would displace conﬂicting
domestic rules,37 though the scope and meaning of a conﬂict is often murky in private law.38
34
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT];
GA Res. 56/83, Art. 3, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec. 12, 2001)
(corrected by A/56/49(Vol I)/Corr.4) [hereinafter ARSIWA].
35
On “direct effect” in EU law, see J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 19 (1999).
36
See Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965,
17 UST 1270, 575 UNTS 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 UST 2517, 330 UNTS 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
37
See VCLT, supra note 34, Art. 27; ARSIWA, supra note 34, Art. 3.
38
For example, express contract terms would not properly “conﬂict” with diverging defaults. See Richard
Craswell, Freedom of Contract, at 1–2 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 33, 1995).
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More surprising are the range and scope of private law rules that tribunals have read into
investment treaties, and thus the extent to which IIL implicitly invades domestic systems
of private law. Most problematically, ISDS jurisprudence has gravitated toward (non-obvious) interpretations of IIL that effectively upend keystone private legal principles. Particularly
with respect to contracts and corporations, the case law has distorted whole ﬁelds of national
private law—mainly vis-à-vis foreigners, but with important spillovers for third parties as well.
Such distortions undermine efﬁciency, fairness, equitable distribution, and other regulatory
values—beneﬁtting neither states nor investors as a class.
III. THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF IIL AND ISDS
This Part turns to a critique of IIL and ISDS from a private law perspective. The following
four sections reassess ISDS case law, each in relation to a discrete private legal regime. Section (A)
casts property as the baseline comparator—the case where IIL and ISDS work more or less as
expected, even if not entirely comfortably. By contrast, Section (B) highlights contract as the
archetypal case of distortion. Here the investment treaty regime goes beyond merely displacing particular rules of national contract law, fundamentally distorting its logic and functions
in the context of foreign direct investment. Section (C) examines corporate law as another
instance of signiﬁcant distortion. The case of corporate law further illustrates the robustness
of the private law frame, by both elucidating and elaborating problems that have been debated
thus far in isolation (such as shareholder suits for reﬂective loss) and illuminating additional
unnoticed distortions (such as apparent authority). Lastly, Section (D) explores how intellectual property offers grounds for (very) cautious optimism, where the few cases decided to date
have proven sensitive to the special features and tradeoffs of trademarks and patents vis-à-vis
other forms of property.
The following case studies proceed in like fashion, moving from functional analysis to
doctrinal critique. Each begins by setting out the core logic and functions of the private
law regime in question. Each then examines how ISDS jurisprudence fares in relation to
these functions, illustrating how the investment treaty regime has (or has not) distorted
these discrete regimes of national private law in the context of foreign direct investment.
A. The Property Model of Investment
Investment treaties work reasonably well in relation to foreign property (in the strict sense).
Treaty deﬁnitions of investment generally cover classical categories of real and personal property,39 and their substantive and procedural guarantees apply straightforwardly to such assets.
While IIL and ISDS do displace particular property rules, they not appear to fundamentally
distort the logic of property law. The major outstanding question—of only passing interest
here—is to what extent IIL protects foreign property relative to national policy and democratic choice.40
39
See, e.g., U.S.-Turkey BIT, Art. 1(c)(i) (“tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens, and pledges”); UK-Argentina BIT, Art. 1(a)(i) (“movable and immovable property and any other
property rights”).
40
Of course, the degree to which the law protects property from state action is of high interest to domestic
property theory. Every society must draw this balance, and it touches upon the full range of societal values. See
Joseph Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 61 DUKE L.J. 1287 (2014). Evidently BITs regulate the balance
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As with all ﬁelds of private law, the law of property serves numerous functions. At the core
are (1) an empowering function, providing for the creation and transfer of rights in rem; (2) a
delimiting function, articulating the types and scope of property rights, against others and
against the state; and, implicit in the latter, (3) a deep regulatory function, in enshrining
and balancing national values in the design of particular property forms. A signal feature of
property law in all jurisdictions, as opposed to contract, is that the law recognizes only a handful of property forms, each comprising a different bundle of rights (such as rights of use or
exclusion) in the service of some particular mix of interests and values.41 This principle of
numerus clausus (“the number is closed”) pervades all aspects of property law, channeling
transactions and interactions with property into relatively rigid lanes. Property law is everywhere marked by a logic of rigid standardization—in contrast to the logic of contract, which
prioritizes choice and customization.42
Property theorists give varying accounts of the numerus clausus principle, and thus property’s logic of standardization. For law and economics scholars, the key lies in the fact that
property rights are held in rem (inhering in the asset), as opposed to contract rights which
are in personam (inhering in only those persons party to the contract). This means that, unlike
contract rights, which are opposable only to contracting parties, property rights are good
against the world.43 Moreover, property rights “run[] with the asset.”44 These features
mean that property rights create high information costs—not only for owners and potential
buyers, but for third parties more generally. As Merrill and Smith explain, “when property
rights are created, third parties must expend time and resources to determine the attributes of
these rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire them.”45 If present holders were free
to carve up their holdings in any way, shape, or form, future buyers, as well as other market
participants and third parties, would face inordinate diligence costs in apprising themselves of
the contents of any parcel.46 The logic of standardization, then, is to reduce the measurement47 and veriﬁcation48 costs inherent in property rights by strictly limiting the available
types of rights in rem. All property systems entail a relatively limited, manageable, and knowable number of property forms, into which the law will funnel owners’ attempts at
customization.

between property protection and regulatory autonomy. Yet the important question of the appropriate level of protection can be settled in myriad ways without denaturing the logic and functions of property law.
41
See Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Veriﬁcation:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002); Nestor Davidson,
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV 1597 (2008).
42
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 3; Davidson, supra note 41, at 1598; Robert Scott & Alan Schwartz,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Arato, supra note 5, at 399.
43
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 8.
44
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at S374.
45
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 8.
46
Excessive individual freedom to dissect and synthesize property forms can also create signiﬁcant societal costs.
See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621–88 (1998).
47
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 24.
48
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at S374.
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Pluralists explain the logic of standardization differently, usefully highlighting important
functions of property law beyond efﬁciency.49 In explaining the pervasive logic of standardization, Davidson emphasizes the wide variation in the particular contents of the forms across
different societies, and over time.50 While acknowledging the efﬁciency functions of standardization in general, he argues that this cannot explain the diversity in which bundles of
rights national systems sanctify as property forms. This variation reveals a regulatory function
of standardization—the content of the forms reﬂects policy choices in the service of particular
societal values, ranging from distribution and fairness to environmental concerns.51
The bottom line is that the logic of property is, everywhere, one of standardization.
National laws recognize a limited number of property forms. Each form entails some bundle
of exclusive rights, against other private actors (e.g. trespass or nuisance rules), and rights
against the state (e.g. protections from expropriation or regulatory takings). And the precise
mix reﬂects each society’s regulatory and democratic choices.
IIL does not substantially distort the logic of property. Investment treaties do displace particular property rules vis-à-vis foreigners, and may strongly affect the relative values enshrined
in national law—usually by requiring greater protection of foreign property and leaving less
room for state regulation. Thus, they can augment national property forms. But IIL leaves the
principle of standardization intact, and it generally relies on national law to deﬁne the basic
contours of property’s different forms.52
Take real property as an example. A foreign investor’s ownership rights in land originate in
the domestic law of the host state. IIL does not purport to create property rights.53 But an
investment treaty does supplement (or displace) the bundle of domestic rights associated with
an investor’s parcel via speciﬁc protections against state action. Typical substantive commitments include strong protections against expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (including some protection of investor expectations), and non-discrimination—all enforceable
through ISDS. These guarantees are typically more robust than their domestic analogues,
but still sit well with the deep logic and functions of national property law. Real property
is still created, registered, and transferred as before, and entails essentially the same bundle
of rights—albeit supplemented, for foreign investors, with additional protections against
state action.
Being largely modeled on how developed countries protect property rights, the basic structure of investment treaties more or less mirrors how national law protects private property
from state action in market economies. For typical market-oriented states, investment treaties
may well affect the level of property protection due to foreigners. But they do not drastically

49

Davidson, supra note 41, at 1600–01.
Id. at 1600.
51
Id. at 1601 (“standardization is a near-universal feature of property systems because the phenomenon facilitates the use of property law to deﬁne, control, and regulate the public aspects of private legal relations with respect
to things . . . any given form represents the resolution of the competition between the multiple and often clashing
ends that property serves”); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES (2011). See also Singer, supra
note 40, at 1303.
52
DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 52.
53
See, e.g., Emmis v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2, Award, para.162 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“Public international law does not create property rights. Rather it accords certain protections to property rights created according to municipal law.”); DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 52.
50
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reshape the nature of property protection.54 The same cannot necessarily be said for all nonmarket economies, whose internal law may be less sanguine about private property. In such
cases, investment treaties may signiﬁcantly transform the meaning and function property law
for foreigner investors. But here, at least, radical change in the protection of private property is
largely the point.55
The property right enshrined in IIL and ISDS is by no means beyond reproach. Every
property regime, national or international, grapples with an intractable tension between private property and government regulation.56 However, the extent of property protection
required by investment treaties is left largely undecided by their text—leaving the scope of
broad and open-textured guarantees like fair and equitable treatment largely up to arbitral
interpretation. Some argue that tribunals occasionally go too far and too fast toward property
absolutism.57 The objection is that ISDS has tended to strike a balance weighted too heavily
in favor of investor property, at the expense of host state regulatory autonomy—though there
are signs that the tide is turning.58 But whether or not the appropriate level of property protection is too capital-friendly, IIL does not appear to distort the basic functions of domestic
(Western-style) property law: providing for legal ownership through particular, veriﬁable
bundles of rights in rem,59 and regulating these bundles’ number, content, and outer
bounds.60
From a private law perspective, then, the criticism of how IIL relates to classical property
forms is really about values more than categories.61 At the margins, it may be debatable
whether IIL paves over conceptual nuance in displacing domestic property rules in particular
jurisdictions and thereby increases uncertainty and information costs regarding the full meaning and value of foreign-owned property rights. But most criticisms in this vein reduce to
value-based concerns about how far investor property should be protected. It is certainly possible that ISDS could develop in ways that distort core principles in the future, for example by
54
Arguably, however, the uncertainty inherent in IIL and ISDS increases the cost of coordination and veriﬁcation substantially for states in determining whose property is entitled to international protection. Such concerns
are likely to become signiﬁcant in view of various methods of treaty shopping. See Arato, supra note 4, at 275;
Simon Batifort & J. Benton Heath, The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in Investment
Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization, 111 AJIL 873 (2018).
55
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 28; CRAWFORD, supra note 2, at 614. But see POULSEN, supra note 11 (demonstrating that, in practice, ofﬁcials responsible for executing BITs in developing countries often lack adequate
information about these treaties’ tradeoffs).
56
Davidson, supra note 41, at 1601; Singer, supra note 40, at 1303.
57
Arato, supra note 4, at 260; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfmann, The Human Right to Private Property, 18
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 391, 393 (2017); Zachary Douglas, Property, Investment, and the Scope of Investment
Protection Obligations, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 363 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014); see also Nicolás Perrone,
The Emerging Global Right to Investment: Understanding the Reasoning Behind Foreign Investor Rights, 8 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 673 (2017). See generally DAGAN, supra note 51.
58
See, e.g., Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, para. 423 (July 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Philip Morris v. Uruguay]; Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award, para. 502
(Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Mesa Power v. Canada] (limiting the scope of “legitimate expectations” protection).
Recent treaties and model BITs have also set heavy presumptions against recovery for regulatory takings. See
Howse, supra note 17.
59
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 8.
60
DAGAN, supra note 51, at xvii–xviii.
61
See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the
Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 63–64 (2003).
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blurring the numerus clausus such that limitations in particular national property forms are
cast aside, or by drawing impermissible analogies to other national systems about the balance
of rights and values embedded in similar forms.62 It is also true that, pushed far enough,
expanding the level of property protection may of itself erode the regulatory functions of
national property law beyond recognition.63 But for now such concerns remain speculative.
IIL may impose overly strong property protections on states. But it does not seem to fundamentally denature the logic of property. By contrast, deeply distortive category problems arise
where IIL and ISDS grapple with other types of investment—and other ﬁelds of private law.
B. Contracts as Investments
Investment treaties typically cover contracts within the deﬁnition of investment.64 As with
property, in extending their substantive protections to contracts, these treaties effectively generate rules of international contract law. Ex ante, both contracting states and investors should
view any applicable treaty norms as part of the package of background legal rules framing all
contractual negotiations. Here, however, IIL and ISDS do not just supplement or displace
particular domestic rules. Investment law further distorts the basic logic of contract, undermining key functions of national contract law.
In contrast to property, the logic of contract law everywhere is one of choice—ﬂexibility
and customization instead of rigid standardization.65 National contract law does standardize,
providing an ediﬁce of background terms that augment party choices. But a key difference
between property and contract is that, with the latter, the background rules are mostly
optional. While property law is typically mandatory, the law of contracts is mostly comprised
of mere default rules. National laws of contracts do impose some rigid rules.66 But in general
contract law prioritizes the choices of private persons, while property law prioritizes the
choices of the state.
Here again, it helps to start from a functional perspective. Contract law has at least four key
functions: (1) empowering private parties to create legally enforceable agreements on the terms
62

See Merrill & Smith, supra note 41; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41.
As Hale notes, American law protects a property holder’s vested rights and legitimate expectations “from
some vicissitudes” but “leaves them exposed to many others—such as competition, the constitutional exercise
of the police power, [and] the increase in the cost of operation.” Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 489 (1923). National systems vary widely in how far such
protection goes. One purpose of investment treaties is to set certain minimums, and this is not necessarily distortive. But a difference of degree could eventually become a difference in kind. Pushed far enough, an absolutist
approach to protecting expectations would arguably erode the nature of property law, for example by insuring
foreign property against any diminution of value caused by regulatory change. See Been & Beauvais, supra note
61. Still, with the arguable exception of a handful of early awards (like Metalclad v. Mexico and Tecmed v. Mexico),
ISDS rarely goes so far—and indeed seems to be going in the opposite direction.
64
See, e.g., Japan-Israel BIT, Art. 1(a) (“The term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset . . . including (v) rights
under contracts, including turnkey, construction, management, production, or revenue-sharing contracts; [and]
(vi) claims to money and to any performance under contract having a ﬁnancial value.”); US-Turkey BIT, Art. 1(c)
(“every kind of investment . . . [including] service and investment contracts . . . (iii) a claim to money or a claim to
performance having economic value, and associated with an investment . . . [and] (v) any right conferred by law or
contract”).
65
HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017); Scott & Schwartz, supra
note 42; Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 8.
66
DAGAN & HELLER supra note 65, at 109; Mariana Pargendler, The Role of the State in Contract Law: The
Common-Civil Law Divide, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 143, 146 (2018).
63
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they prefer; (2) setting rules for interpreting contracts; (3) ﬁlling gaps in incomplete contracts;
and (4) regulating the outer bounds of acceptable bargaining behavior and outcomes.67 The
notion of party choice pervades these functions, but not blindly. Where parties have not chosen or their choices are unclear, the state provides terms that it deems appropriate—either in
hopes of capturing what most parties would have wanted (majoritarian defaults),68 or in the
service of other values (as with penalty defaults).69 In rare cases, the state will intervene even
where the parties have chosen—regulating choice via sticky defaults and mandatory rules and,
at the limit, through rules on contract formation and validity.
IIL and ISDS distort the logic and functions of contract law from both sides—by constraining parties’ ability to choose, and by constraining the state’s capacity to regulate choice.
I ﬁrst show how IIL and ISDS undercut contract law’s basic logic of customization, distorting
both its empowering and gap-ﬁlling functions with costs for efﬁciency and autonomy. I then
explore the mirror-image problem, where ISDS tribunals water down national mandatory
rules that serve values outside of contractual efﬁciency—such as contract formation rules
meant to preserve government transparency and anti-corruption norms. In so doing, the
case law further distorts the regulatory functions of contract law.
1. Implied terms and the logic of choice
No legal system expects parties to negotiate every aspect of a contract. All laws of contract
provide ready-made implied terms to supplement agreements—ranging from technical matters which parties often do not discuss, like damages, defenses, and forum selection, to bases of
substantive obligation (such as warranties)70 and even price.71 Parties can and do expressly
negotiate such terms—all of which affect price and risk allocation. But parties need not negotiate everything, every time. By providing off-the-rack background rules, contract law allows
parties to avoid reinventing the wheel from deal to deal. These implied terms are usually
optional—mere defaults, around which parties may contract to pursue joint goals as they
see ﬁt. Prioritizing party choice serves a wide range of values, from autonomy, to efﬁciency,
to community.72
Implied terms differ dramatically across national systems. As with property forms, their
content is fundamentally a regulatory question about which values to prioritize and how
much to prioritize them. In the United States, for example, contract law typically sets defaults
on a majoritarian basis, reﬂecting the courts’ (or legislatures’) best guess at what contracting
parties would have wanted ex ante, had they considered the issue.73 But myriad other
67
ROBERT SCOTT & JODY KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 2–4 (2013); Robin Bradley Kar, Contract as
Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2016).
68
Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,
69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983).
69
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
70
Goetz & Scott, supra note 68, at 971.
71
See, e.g., UCC 2-305.
72
Arato, supra note 5, at 400–01. See DAGAN & HELLER supra note 65, at 5, 49–65; Scott & Schwartz, supra
note 42; Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489,
490 (1989).
73
Goetz & Scott, supra note 68, at 971.
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approaches are possible.74 What is common everywhere is that parties may generally bargain
around these rules to secure the mix of goods, incentives, and values they see ﬁt.
This is not to say that national laws of contract are only comprised of default rules—or that
contracts are completely customizable. The ﬂexibility of any particular background rule is
itself a policy choice, and nations vary widely in exactly where and why they introduce rigidity
into the law of contracts.75 Like content, rigidity reﬂects its own axis of regulatory values, such
as how much faith to place in markets, how much to prioritize individual choice, and the
state’s proper role in creating the conditions for relational equality in private legal transactions.76 Still, for the most part, contract law seeks to empower parties to commit to one
another on terms that they deem appropriate.77 IIL and ISDS turn this logic on its head.
To capture the problem, it is important to ﬁrst see clearly how and why national contract
law limits choice at the margins. Choice can be limited completely through mandatory rules.
But choice can also be constrained more provisionally through “sticky defaults”—rules that
parties may contract around, but only through observing certain formalities (by requiring a
clear statement, special contractual language, or even a separate signed writing).78 Both kinds
of constraints can be grounded in values internal to the logic of contract, or on the basis of
external values. The ﬁrst type of justiﬁcation considers sticky defaults and mandatory rules
appropriate where they serve to enhance choice, by putting the parties on equal footing or by
correcting for market failures.79 These kinds of constraints serve to establish the rules of the
game, protect basic fairness among contracting parties, and the like. For example, some sticky
defaults correct information asymmetries, by requiring that opt-outs employ special language
that forces better informed parties to reveal potentially hidden information to less wellinformed parties—like the scope of their default rights.80 A second type of justiﬁcation for
constraining choice relies on extrinsic values, such as mandatory rules precluding contracts of
enslavement or contracts to commit a crime, mandatory and/or sticky protections for workers, or limitations on one government’s ability to tie the hands of a future government
through contracts with private parties.
Contract law thus involves two broad, and conceptually discrete, regulatory questions: (1)
how to set the content of the background rules, and (2) how ﬂexible or rigid to make them.
National laws vary on both, reﬂecting different priorities and values. But the general spirit
always lies in prioritizing the choices of particular contracting parties rather than the general
default choices erected by the state. IIL and ISDS muddy the waters for both questions.
In extending to contracts, IIL obviously affects domestic contract rules. But unlike with
property, it is not at all obvious what kind of effect investment treaties ought to have on a
74
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covered contract. Investment treaties leave unclear both (1) the scope and content of treaty
rules applicable to contracts, and, crucially, (2) the way in which such rules interact with contracts (as defaults, mandatory rules, or something in between).
ISDS tribunals have consistently read investment treaties as covering a surprisingly broad
scope of contractual matters, ranging from substantive obligations, to defenses, damages, and
forum selection terms. All tribunals assume, sensibly, that, whatever their scope, investment
treaties displace conﬂicting background rules in the law of the contract. However, the cases
have been all over the map on the core question of choice, with some tribunals viewing treaty
rules as mandatory, others viewing the same rules as sticky defaults, and still others viewing
them as fully customizable. Such uncertainty is itself a serious problem for all contracting
parties ex ante. Moreover, the jurisprudence has tended to drift in the wrong direction, prioritizing treaty over contract, and conﬂating the logic of contract with that of property.
Examples from the case law on three kinds of treaty terms sufﬁce to illustrate the problem:
(a) fair and equitable treatment, (b) damages, and (c) forum selection.81
a. Fair and Equitable Treatment: Stabilization and Expectations
Fair and equitable treatment is one of the most common investment treaty standards, and
among the most controversial. It is also the standard most commonly invoked by investors,
and often proves outcome determinative.82 In most treaties the standard is stated laconically.
The thorniest point of contention is whether the requirement of fair and equitable treatment
protects an investor’s “legitimate expectations,” and to what extent that entails compensation
for losses arising out of regulatory change—i.e., an implied “stabilization” clause, in contracts
terminology.83 Most tribunals accept that fair and equitable treatment requires protecting
investor expectations to some degree.84 Of interest here is a second order question: whether
(and how) states and investors can contract around the treaty rule. This question arises in
every ISDS arbitration involving contracts. However, the cases rarely examine it explicitly,
necessitating some reading between the lines.
The Argentine Gas cases provide the archetypal mandatory approach, resolving the issue
implicitly and formalistically.85 In Sempra, Enron, and CMS, the tribunals read fair and
81
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equitable treatment as entailing broad stabilization requirements, applicable to investments
arising out of contracts as to any other investment.86 Each tribunal assumed that treaty claims
are completely independent from contract claims, and found that its jurisdiction was limited
to the former.87 On this formalistic view, it does not matter if the investment triggering treaty
protection is property, contract, or anything else; once triggered, fair and equitable treatment
always demands the same level of treatment. The scope and meaning of treaty rights turn not
at all on the content of the underlying contract and are unaffected by anything the contract
says about the scope of stabilization, or even waiver of treaty rights.
From the perspective of contract law and theory, the reasoning of the Argentine Gas cases is
misleading. The formalistic separation of treaty and contract only serves to mask what it
implies—that, far from being independent, any immutable treaty provision triggered by a
contract-based investment simply rewrites the deal struck by the parties by inserting a
new, effectively mandatory term.88 On this view, the investment treaty effectively displaces
any conﬂicting rules of national contract law with rigid international standards. If an investment contract always triggers immutable treaty protections then, ex ante, states and investors
must assume that IIL will apply whatever they choose to put in the contract—and they must
price it in accordingly, whether or not it is efﬁcient. Thus, on these tribunals’ interpretation of
fair and equitable treatment, states and investors would always be stuck with an implied stabilization clause, however extremely that affects price—or even the parties’ willingness to contract—and whether or not such a provision is important to the investor.89
Although most tribunals follow the Argentine Gas cases in assuming the rigidity of
substantive treaty standards, a handful of decisions have hinted at more ﬂexible
approaches. In Parkerings v. Lithuania, the tribunal implicitly viewed fair and equitable
treatment as a mere default rule. First, it viewed the standard more minimally than the
Argentine Gas cases.90 However, it considered that states and investors are free to ratchet
up the level of protection that fair and equitable treatment would entail by negotiating for
a stabilization clause in the contract.91 In other words, treaty and contract cannot be neatly
separated, and the parties can control the scope of fair and equitable treatment. Parkerings and
decisions like it differ markedly from the Argentine Gas cases in treating fair and equitable
treatment as a mere default whose scope can be enlarged (and, arguably, reduced or waived)
by agreement.92
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MNSS v. Montenegro provides yet a third option—that fair and equitable treatment (and
other treaty standards) are defaults, but only very sticky ones.93 To contract around them,
states and investors must use exceptionally clear language. The privatization agreement in
MNSS included a clause waiving BIT and other international legal rights by name—though
it was somewhat murky about how far it disclaimed them.94 In principle, the tribunal considered that states and investors could contract around fair and equitable treatment, ﬁnding
that “investors may waive the rights conferred to them by treaty provided [the] waivers are
explicit and freely entered into. . . .”95 And it was satisﬁed that this contract’s express and speciﬁc opt-out sufﬁciently demonstrated a mutual intention to contract around the treaty. The
tribunal thus gave effect to the disclaimer, but read it narrowly, apparently operating under an
unstated presumption against waiver.96 Moreover, the tribunal suggested that the treaty
might not be entirely optional, indicating opaquely that it might not have given effect to a
waiver that contravened the “public purpose” pursued by the BIT.97
b. Forum Selection
Most modern investment treaties empower investors to compel host states into ISDS. But
BITs and free trade agreements (FTAs) generally do not elaborate on whether their procedural
rights turn on the type of investment at issue. Thus, in relation to contracts, any applicable
investment treaty will provide a clear background term on forum selection. Left completely
unclear is what happens if the contract waives such rights via an exclusive forum selection
clause—designating domestic courts or another arbitral mechanism.
Conﬂicts between treaty and contractual forum selection clauses occur frequently in ISDS.
Here too, tribunals have gone in every possible direction. For some, ISDS is a mandatory
procedural right, while for others it is just another default with varying levels of stickiness.
SGS v. Paraguay reﬂects the mandatory view.98 Like the Argentine Gas cases, the tribunal
accepted the notion that investment treaty claims and contract claims must be cleanly separated.99 The relevant BIT included an umbrella clause, purporting to convert a breach of an
investment contract into a treaty breach. In the tribunal’s view, a contract covered by such a
clause would create two separate tracks of rights—a set of purely contractual rights, and a
distinct set of treaty rights. The parties can disclaim ISDS for the former by exclusively selecting domestic courts in the contract. But they cannot waive ISDS for breach of treaty rights,
even if the latter were generated by the same contract via the umbrella clause. Other tribunals
have similarly disregarded contractual exclusive forum selection clauses in fair and equitable
treatment and expropriation cases.100
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Several cases have gone the other way, on markedly similar facts, viewing ISDS as a waivable default. The tribunals in SGS v. Philippines and BIVAC v. Paraguay found that treaty and
contract could not be neatly separated.101 They held that the treaty cannot alter the bargain
struck between the contracting parties. An exclusive forum selection clause opting to resolve
all disputes in local courts is obviously part of that deal, presumably bought and paid for ex
ante. Each tribunal thus held that breach could only be authoritatively determined by the
contractually chosen forum, and thus any umbrella clause claims would be inadmissible
prior to an authoritative ﬁnding of breach by a local court. Other tribunals have followed
this default approach outside of the umbrella clause context.102
Still other decisions have viewed ISDS as a sticky default, which states and investors may
waive by contract, but only by observing certain formalities—such as by clear statement, or
use of magic words. In Aguas del Tunari, the tribunal refused to “read an ambiguous clause as
an implicit waiver of [International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)]
jurisdiction,” adding that “silence as to the question is not sufﬁcient.”103 The tribunal in
Crystallex went further, ﬁnding that “any such waiver would have to be formulated in clear
and speciﬁc terms,”104 and that waiver “is never to be lightly admitted as it requires knowledge and intent of forgoing a right, a conduct rather unusual in economic transactions.”105
Here the tribunal rejected an exclusive forum selection clause which expressly required that all
disputes be resolved in Venezuelan court.106 Though this clause surely reveals that the parties
were aware of the scope of their procedural rights under the contract, it might not indicate
that the investor knew that it was giving up a treaty right to ISDS. The tribunal suggested,
without elaboration, that to be effective such a waiver would need to mention the BIT or
ISDS by name.107 Reading between the lines, the justiﬁcation for this approach may have
been information-forcing—to protect investors who might not be aware of their rights
(and leverage) under an investment treaty ex ante.108
c. Damages
All laws of contract include implied damages rules—standards of recovery, such as expectancy, reliance, and restitution, as well as myriad corollary technical rules for valuation.
National damages rules are typically defaults, enabling the parties—who are typically best
101
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equipped to allocate risk and price efﬁciently—to negotiate the scope of future recovery as
they see ﬁt. Contract law may impose limits, especially to police clauses imposing disproportionate, punitive, or otherwise unconscionable damages. But the parties retain wide latitude
to negotiate over future recovery, through liquidated damages provisions, damages caps, and
so on. The same is true of government contracts, though here national law often provides for
weaker damages provisions by default,109 and may make contracting around such defaults
more difﬁcult.110 The rationale is typically an entrenchment concern about chilling regulatory autonomy—a worry that one government might tie the hands of future governments
through privatization.111
Investment treaties say very little about damages. They typically provide no general damages
rule applicable across their provisions.112 Nor do they differentiate among investments for purposes of measuring damages. ISDS tribunals thus typically draw on general international law
damages principles and apply them to all types of investments—usually landing on “fair market
value” as the applicable measure of compensation.113 This entails measuring the present value
of the asset, taking into account its capacity to generate income over time.114 For contracts, fair
market value is typically taken to entail expectation damages.115 Tribunals implicitly invoke fair
market value as a double default—an implied expectation damages rule in general international
law, to be read into the “incomplete” investment treaty absent any special provision on damages, and thereby read into any investment contract to which the treaty applies.116 But, here
again, tribunals have divided over whether fair market value is negotiable or mandatory.
Several tribunals have simply assumed that international law damages cannot be abrogated
by contract, as in the Argentine Gas cases117 and the more recent ExxonMobil v. Venezuela.118
For the former, the assumption followed from the strict separation of treaty and contract,
discussed above. The latter relied on a different but equally inapposite formalism, ﬁnding
that treaty rigidity followed from the principle that internal law cannot excuse a violation
of international law.119 As a result, the tribunal held that it could not give effect to potentially
limiting compensation provisions in the underlying concession contract.
These tribunals’ explanations are questionable as a matter of both law and economics. First,
as a technical matter, a contractual limitation on damages reﬂects the parties’ choice to limit
109
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the scope of their mutual obligations ex ante—not an excuse for breach ex post, as posited by
ExxonMobil. There is no reason that international law cannot provide private parties with
negotiable default terms—as does the Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).120 Second, even under fair market value analysis, any compensation clause in the
contract would clearly affect the market value of the investment, and cannot be ignored.
As Abi-Saab asks rhetorically, in the related (ongoing) ConocoPhillips case: “how can any
homo economicus exercising rational choice as a ‘willing buyer’ . . . calculate the price he
would be willing to pay, without factoring in . . . the terms of the compensation clauses of
the Agreements?”121 To ignore contractual limitations on damages effectively implies that fair
market value imposes a mandatory rule, providing for full expectation damages, whatever the
parties have agreed as between themselves. This approach inexplicably constrains parties’ ability to bargain over damages in allocating contractual risk ex ante.
Other tribunals have understood treaty damages as defaults of varying ﬂexibility. Most
spectacularly, Venezuela succeeded in having the ExxonMobil Award abrogated on precisely
this point (for failure to state reasons). The ad hoc annulment committee rightly dismissed as a
straw man the tribunal’s incantation that internal law cannot excuse a breach of international
law,122 and found that the tribunal failed to otherwise explain ignoring the contractual compensation clause.123 The committee stressed that the unjustiﬁed implication of the tribunal’s
approach was to boot-strap fair market value, an international law standard not found in the
BIT, into an effectively mandatory rule for all contracts covered by the treaty.124 The committee strongly questioned whether the BIT could reasonably be interpreted to prevent parties from contracting around treaty damages, but, given its limited mandate, stopped short of
expounding the precise relationship between treaty and contract. With less fanfare, the tribunal in Siag also appeared to view fair market value as a mere default, simply taking contractual
compensation clauses into account in assessing damages.125 Still other tribunals, like
Kardassopoulos, have understood fair market value as a sticky default, with a strong presumption against opt-out, similar to MNSS and Crystallex.126
d. Distorting the Logic of Choice
In their application to investment contracts, investment treaties establish rules of international contract law. However, the treaties are invariably silent about how their standards relate
to contractual choice. This second order question arises in every ISDS case involving
120
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contracts. Yet the cases rarely engage with this issue directly, let alone with the policy matters
at stake, generally proceeding on the basis of mere assumptions.127 Moreover, tribunals have
resolved the treaty/contract relationship in all possible ways. Most tend to assume that investment treaty rules are effectively mandatory, or at least as very sticky defaults. Only a few have
viewed IIL as presumptively optional, though this is the norm with background rules at
national law and would generally be the better rule here as well.
In the case of contracts, then, IIL and ISDS displace domestic law in two different ways.
First, investment treaties clearly displace conﬂicting national background rules, supplanting
domestic implied terms with international ones. This form of displacement is not especially
problematic, although it is perhaps startling how broad a range of implied terms have been
read into investment treaties. However, under the approach of most tribunals, investment
treaties displace national law in another, more troubling way—by supplanting the express
choices of the parties to particular contracts, either through mandatory terms or very sticky
defaults. This turns the logic of contract upside down.
The investment treaty regime thus distorts national contract law in two discrete ways. First,
absent any mechanism for systematizing the jurisprudence, the sheer variation in approaches
creates acute uncertainty. This is a second-order problem, sharper than the typical critique of
ISDS inconsistency. As is often noted, states and investors always grapple with potentially
inconsistent arbitral interpretations of substantive standards of treatment128—a real problem,
but not one altogether avoidable in any legal system. One might imagine that states and investors could respond to such uncertainty ex ante, by contracting for what they consider really
important. Uncertainty cannot be completely avoided, but it can be mitigated. Here, however, the second-order uncertainty problem exerts its sting. Given the treaty/contract jurisprudence, states and investors cannot know whether their ex ante attempts to deﬁne the scope
of their obligations through contract will be given effect at ISDS ex post. This leaves the meaning of contracts between foreign investors and states or state-owned enterprises in substantial
doubt. All parties will have to take risks associated with such uncertainty into account ex ante,
affecting price and potentially dampening the parties’ incentives to contract—precisely the
opposite of what investment treaties set out to achieve.
Second, the ISDS jurisprudence tends to gravitate in the wrong direction, toward making
treaty rules mandatory for covered contracts. Quite apart from the uncertainty problem, this
is a bad rule, needlessly inefﬁcient and likely unjust—even assuming perfect rationality of
states and investors. In law and economics (or Coasean) terms, under ideal market conditions
(perfect rationality and low transaction costs), the content of investment treaty rules should
not matter, because states and investors would bargain in their shadow to achieve an efﬁcient
127
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result.129 The market would push them to allocate resources efﬁciently. But even in ideal theory, this proposition only holds if the parties are free to negotiate around the law—meaning
the background rules are mere defaults. If the parties are stuck with the background rules,
then their content matters a great deal, and will likely prove inefﬁcient under many constellations of market conditions. In other words, it is much more likely that the parties to an
investment contract will be able to bargain to an efﬁcient result, given their own needs,
than it is that the states parties to an investment treaty will be able to predict the most efﬁcient
contract terms, across a range of issues, for all contracts to which the treaty applies.
Of course, there is little reason to assume perfect rationality in transnational government
contracting. In practice, the mandatory approach is likely to prove not only inefﬁcient, but
quite unjust. It is not safe to assume that state ofﬁcials and agents of state-owned entities
charged with negotiating contracts will be aware of the contents of IIL and ISDS jurisprudence—nor that anything outside the agreed law of the contract will govern whether their
chosen contractual terms are effective. This is especially so for developing countries, with
smaller legal staffs and less resources available for due diligence.130 Given that investment
treaty standards will be typically more favorable to investors than either the domestic contract
laws or the particular contractual choices that they displace, states will likely ﬁnd themselves
on the wrong end of surprise claims arising out of investment contracts—with unexpected
legal exposure measured in millions or billions of dollars. This is not to say that ignorance
of the law should be an excuse. The point is rather that a rigid approach to the treaty/contract
problem will be more likely to lead to perverse outcomes—and this should be taken into
account in thinking through treaty design and interpretation.
The optimal approach for IIL would (usually) be to privilege contractual arrangements
over background treaty rules.131 The treaty/contract problem is not zero-sum. Although
states and investors have different interests and values at stake, both sides usually stand to
beneﬁt from the freedom to negotiate around treaty rules. There may be good reason to
make speciﬁc rules stickier.132 But given the costs, this should be justiﬁed on a case-bycase basis, in terms of the values, incentives, and risks implicated by the particular treaty
rule in question—not on the basis of broad formalisms about the relationships between treaty
and contract, or international law and domestic law.133 Generally prioritizing party choice is
not only optimal from the economic standpoint—it also empowers states to secure their
future regulatory autonomy, by controlling for risk through limitations on damages, force
majeure clauses, and so on. Though investment treaties protect foreign investors’ contract
rights, it makes little sense to bar states and investors from contracting around treaty terms
at arm’s length. A contract represents a bargain struck by the parties; if the goal of the treaty is
129

See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
Though the empirical work remains to be done, one can cautiously extrapolate from Poulsen’s study of
treaty negotiation by developing countries that similar problems of bounded rationality are likely to arise in the
context of government contracting. See POULSEN, supra note 11.
131
See Arato, supra note 5, at 397.
132
Id.
133
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the magic words ex ante. Absent a system of precedent, or clear (and excessively intricate) treaty drafting, it will be
difﬁcult for states and investors to predict which words and phrases will make opt out effective.
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to protect the bargain as struck ex ante, then it should not be taken as license to rewrite the deal
ex post.
2. Contract Formation and Regulation
Not everything in contract law is about facilitating choice. All laws of contract limit party
autonomy in order to make choice itself more meaningful—through laying out rules of the
game (basic formalities for formation), policing the bargaining process (e.g. mandatory fraud
and duress doctrines), pushing parties to share certain kinds of information, and so on.134
National contract law also limits some choices in the service of extrinsic values, typically
through mandatory rules—for example, by policing distribution and abuse at the margins
through unconscionability and good faith doctrines, invalidating contracts to commit a
crime, and imposing limits on government contracting to safeguard public administration
and democratic choice.135 All this comprises a core regulatory function of contract law—
the state must address these matters if it is to make contract law effective, and to safeguard
other community values from the market. However, investment treaties diminish the state’s
capacity to regulate the limits of contractual freedom. Not only do IIL and ISDS inefﬁciently
limit party choice (without good reason); they also constrain how the state uses contract law to
limit choice in the service of other national values.
The recent award in Bankswitch v. Ghana amply demonstrates how IIL and ISDS can distort the regulatory functions of contract law in the context of anti-corruption norms. The
Ghanaian Constitution provides that any “international business or economic transaction,”
including contracts between the government and foreign investors, can only come into effect
after parliamentary approval.136 The Constitution limits the executive’s ability to unilaterally
contract with foreigners in order to bolster transparency and accountability in a context where
corruption is rife and effects on the public purse can be dramatic. The rule manages agency
costs in government (i.e., the risk of executive self-dealing) by putting both Ghanaian ofﬁcials
and foreign investors on notice that government contracts require legislative approval. In
Bankswitch, the investor contracted with the government to develop software for Ghanaian
customs authorities, and invested heavily in the project over three years. It relied on assurances that the contract was valid by various government ofﬁcials (including the attorney general) even absent parliamentary approval.137 The tribunal agreed with Ghana that the alleged
contract was subject to the constitutional formation requirements, which all agreed were not
satisﬁed. Nevertheless, the tribunal found the contract valid under a lenient promissory estoppel rule, which was supposedly grounded in customary international law138—displacing the
mandatory Ghanaian formation rule, and eroding the state’s ability to regulate government
corruption.
Bankswitch did not involve an investment treaty. Rather, it arose out of an investment contract between Bankswitch and Ghana, under Ghanaian law, providing for ISDS through
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arbitration under UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.139
However the tribunal determined that general international law applied to the contract,
including aspects of IIL, and that it could rely on ISDS case law in ﬂeshing out both the contract’s terms and the conditions for valid contract formation. First, the tribunal implied that
customary international law might apply to the contract simply in light of its international
nature.140 But in any case, it held that custom would enter the picture as a convoluted triple
default. The contract was governed only by Ghanaian law, and did not expressly incorporate
international law. Nor does Ghanaian law expressly incorporate international law. Amazingly,
however, the tribunal found that “Ghana, as a former British Colony, is a common law country, and principles of English common law are generally applied in Ghana as highly persuasive
(if not binding) authority,” and that it could apply such English common law principles as
were not expressly displaced by Ghanaian statute or binding case law.141 Since English common law directly incorporates customary international law into domestic law, and since
Ghanaian law says nothing on the subject, the tribunal found the English “doctrine of incorporation” implicitly applicable in Ghana. In this way, the tribunal drew on customary international law and ISDS case law to read an implied doctrine of promissory estoppel into
Ghanaian law.142 Thus, in the tribunal’s view, an international contract governed by
Ghanaian law, but invalid under that law, could be given effect under a theory of contract
formation by estoppel derived from international law—even if it ﬂatly contradicts constitutional requirements.143
Finding the conditions for promissory estoppel satisﬁed, the tribunal enforced the contract, and ultimately found Ghana in breach.144 The problem is that this approach entirely
upends the constitutional anti-corruption provision. Article 181(5) is meant to check government action—to mitigate agency costs associated with corruption in the executive branch, by
precluding ofﬁcials from executing large-scale international contracts without parliamentary
oversight. Allowing these same ofﬁcials to vitiate the constraints on their action merely by
making representations to the investor makes the intended constitutional constraint effectively optional. The tribunal’s approach not only displaces national constraints on contract
formation, but further distorts the state’s capacity to regulate government corruption at the
constitutional level.145
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Bankswitch was a hard case. Both parties had real grievances. The company was induced, and given assurances that its contract was valid without parliamentary approval by the highest ofﬁcials of the government. But this
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3. Distorting the Logic of Contract
Including contracts in the deﬁnition of investment effectively transforms IIL into a rudimentary, yet broad, law of contracts—governing agreements between states and foreign
investors on pivotal issues, from implied terms to rules on formation. However, this emerging
international law of contracts has developed sporadically, irregularly, and inconsistently
through ISDS, due in part to a tendency among tribunals to confuse the logics of contract
and property.
As a result, it remains uncertain whether contracting parties should understand background treaty norms as defaults, sticky defaults, or mandatory terms—leaving the meaning
of their contracts under a cloud of doubt. Such uncertainty is already highly inefﬁcient ex ante,
and unfair insofar as it leads to undue (and costly) surprise ex post. Further, to the extent tribunals tend toward viewing treaty provisions as mandatory, the jurisprudence has further
undercut states’ and investors’ capacity to bargain. IIL and ISDS thus distort the empowering
and gap-ﬁlling functions of national contract law for no good reason. At the same time, IIL
and ISDS can distort the regulatory function of national contract law, by providing an end
run around domestic constraints on bargaining.
Thus, in sum, the investment treaty regime distorts national contract law from both ends.
On the one hand, it distorts contract’s logic of customization by imposing far-ranging rigid
terms on states and investors—constraining their ability to bargain to efﬁcient outcomes, and,
in so doing, limiting the state’s ability to control the scope of its liability. On the other hand,
ISDS also stands in the way of the state’s attempts to constrain contracts in the service of
extrinsic regulatory values.
C. Corporate Law and the Corporate Form in ISDS
A similarly problematic dynamic arises between investment law and corporate law. As with
contracts, IIL and ISDS erect rules of international corporate law, with a surprising and textually non-obvious scope. In certain key instances, they subvert keystone principles of
national corporate law, and thereby distort central functions of the corporate form. These
distortions undercut efﬁciency, fairness, and equitable distribution, affecting not only host
states, but also all corporate constituencies—including insiders (shareholders and management) and outsiders (creditors and third parties), wherever they reside.
Here again the problem starts with the deﬁnition of investment. Investment treaties
expressly protect both natural and legal persons. Corporations thus enjoy protection as investors in their own right where their assets qualify as covered investments. But the deﬁnition of
investment in most BITs and FTAs also includes stocks and shares, meaning that shareholders
in a locally incorporated company also qualify as covered investors. This extends beyond controlling stakes, to minority shares and even indirect equity—meaning shares in an enterprise
held through intermediary companies.146 The rationale seems to be that host states often
See, e.g., Japan-Israel BIT, Art. 1(a) (“the term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset . . . owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, including: (i) an enterprise and a branch of an enterprise; [and] (ii)
shares, stocks, and other forms of equity participation in an investment . . .”); US-Turkey BIT, Art. 1(c) (“‘investment’ means every kind of investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, debt . . . (ii) a
company or shares, stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof”). Because most treaties
cover indirect shares, their coverage potentially extends to long parent-subsidiary chains.
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require (or encourage) foreigners to invest through a local entity, in hopes of generating beneﬁts for local development (jobs, transfer of know-how, etc.). As a national of the host state,
that company would not be covered by the typical investment treaty. But by including stocks
and shares, the treaties cover foreigners investing in the local entity.147 As with contracts, the
problem here is that investment treaties tend not to specify how their provisions apply to
shareholders, leaving unanswered substantial questions about differentiation and ﬁt. Left
to interpret these matters, ISDS tribunals have tended toward positions that distort central
principles and functions of domestic corporate law—in both host and home states.148
The business corporation (or company) is the most common vehicle for the large scale
investment projects at issue in ISDS.149 Across all legal systems, the corporate form exhibits
the same core characteristics: (1) separate legal personality; (2) limited shareholder liability;
(3) transferable shares; (4) centralized management; and (5) shared investor ownership.150
Together, these interrelated features provide a streamlined and efﬁcient vehicle for mobilizing
capital at scale—one which is “uniquely effective at minimizing coordination costs.”151 The
primary function of corporate law everywhere is thus to empower private parties to organize
their businesses through this uniquely efﬁcient legal form.152 Selection of the corporate form,
in turn, signals the applicability of well-known basic rules, imparting substantial expectations
among corporate insiders (shareholders and management), and outside constituencies (creditors, governments, and publics).153
The second key function of corporate law is regulatory. Despite its merits, the corporate
form tends to create serious agency problems (or conﬂicts of interest): between shareholders
and managers; between controlling and minority shareholders; and between shareholders and
outside constituencies (especially creditors).154 These problems largely arise out of the same
features that give the corporate form its distinct value. The bulk of corporate law in all jurisdictions is dedicated to mitigating these conﬂicts to “reduc[e] the ongoing costs of organizing
business through the corporate form.”155 Importantly, however, there is no single blueprint;
national systems of corporate law differ substantially in which legal strategies they adopt to
manage the relevant tradeoffs, reﬂecting substantial differences in values and priorities.156
IIL and ISDS tend to upset both the empowering and regulatory functions of corporate law
by distorting national legal arrangements in underappreciated ways. To illustrate this
Where the ﬁrm is foreign, both it and its shareholders arguably enjoy separate treaty coverage. See infra, II.C.1.
For brevity, I limit the discussion to corporations—but analogous problems arise for other organizational
forms.
149
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problem, I focus on just one of the corporation’s hallmark features: separate legal personality.
However, it will be clear that IIL affects its other characteristics as well.
Separate legal personality is a sine qua non of the corporate form. It allows the “ﬁrm to serve
[a] coordinating role by operating as a single contracting party that is distinct from the various
individuals who own or manage the ﬁrm.”157 Personality entails three core capacities: (i) separate ownership; (ii) the ﬁrm’s capacity to contract in its own name; and (iii) capacity to sue
and be sued in its own name.158 Each of these components depend on key background legal
rules,159 which, in each case, are undermined by IIL and ISDS. Some further speciﬁcity helps
to show why.
Separate ownership (or “separate patrimony” in civil law) is the most technical aspect of
personality. The basic idea is that the corporation can own assets in its own right, hived off
from its shareholders. Such patrimony includes “rights to use the assets, to sell them, and—of
particular importance—to make them available for attachment by [the corporation’s] creditors.”160 Conversely, the ﬁrm’s assets are unavailable for attachment by shareholders’ personal
creditors. Emphasizing function over form, law and economics literature refers to this aspect
as “entity shielding.”161 Separate patrimony, or entity shielding, is produced by two distinct
background rules: a creditor priority rule, granting the ﬁrm’s creditors a claim on corporate
assets prior to any claims by shareholders or their personal creditors; and a rule of liquidation
protection, barring shareholders from withdrawing their share of corporate assets at will.162
Together, these rules “protect the going concern value of the ﬁrm against destruction by individual shareholders or their creditors.”163 Entity shielding is what allows a ﬁrm to assure outsiders (such as creditors) that it will be able to carry out its obligations. It facilitates negotiating
contracts and, ultimately, shareholder liquidity.164
The other two capacities of separate legal personality similarly require dedicated legal rules
to make them fully viable. The capacity of a corporation to contract in its own name requires
clear rules about who acts for the corporation—who may buy and sell in its name, or otherwise commit its resources. Some can be defaults—corporations are generally free to decide
how actual authority is delegated. However, the law must at minimum provide rigid rules
on apparent authority to protect third parties.165 Similarly, the capacity to sue and be sued
requires background legal procedures specifying how the ﬁrm can initiate, or be subjected to,
litigation. For example, most jurisdictions provide that, in general, management (not shareholders) makes litigation decisions on behalf of the corporation, and all recovery is due to, or
from, the ﬁrm (not its owners).166

157

Armour et al., supra note 149, at 5.
Id. at 5–7.
159
See Armour, et al., supra note 149, at 8.
160
Id. at 5–6.
161
See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1335 (2006).
162
Exit must rather be accomplished by sale of shares. See Armour, et al., supra note 149, at 6.
163
Id. at 6.
164
Id. at 7.
165
Id.
166
Gaukrodger, supra note 8, at 23.
158

32

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 113:1

As a whole, separate legal personality facilitates efﬁcient contracting, reduces conﬂicts of
interest and associated agency costs, and, ex ante, serves to reduce the costs of capital.
However, “[t]he outcomes achieved by each of these three types of rules—entity shielding,
authority, and procedure—require dedicated legal doctrines to be effective,” rules which,
empirically, all national legal systems provide without major differences.167 It is therefore
striking that IIL and ISDS have managed to subvert the rules undergirding each component
of separate legal personality, in sometimes serious ways, without much in the way of policy
justiﬁcation for doing so. I illustrate such distortions in two contexts: (1) shareholder suits for
reﬂective loss; and (2) apparent authority.
1. Shareholder Claims for Reﬂective Loss
If the problem with how investment law grapples with contracts stems from the underspeciﬁed relationship between contracts-as-investments and substantive treaty protections, the
problem with stocks and shares relates more to the procedural right of access to ISDS. While it
is clear that stocks and shares are covered investments,168 BITs tend to say very little about
just how shareholder-investors may bring suit, and whether such procedural rights might differ from rights of suit relating to property, contracts, or intellectual property. Though counterintuitive at ﬁrst blush, there is no reason to assume that each type of investment is meant to,
or should, involve the same kind of access to arbitration. To the contrary, the assumption that
investors in stocks or shares possess unqualiﬁed access to ISDS substantially distorts national
corporate law, upsetting the careful tradeoffs of interests and values established by both home
and host state jurisdictions, with perverse consequences for corporate constituencies wherever
they reside.
Investment treaties typically say very little about shareholder standing. The 2017 JapanIsrael BIT is typical.169 Article 1 provides:
(a) the term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset . . . owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by an investor, including . . . (ii) shares, stocks or other forms of equity
participation in an enterprise.”
Beyond that, Article 24(2) provides very generally that an investor
. . . may submit to arbitration under this Article a claim: (a) that the respondent [state] has
breached an obligation under Section I . . .; and (b) that the claimant has incurred loss or
damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.
The connection between these provisions seems facially straightforward: shareholders-quainvestors appear empowered to sue the state directly for treaty breaches causing diminution
in share value. From a corporate law perspective, however, things become immediately
murky.
With real property, the relationship between the investment and the right to invoke ISDS
is perfectly clear. In case of a dispute, the investor-in-property may compel the host state into
167

Armour, et al., supra note 149, at 7–8.
Only a very small handful of treaties limit coverage for shareholdings. See, e.g., Turkey-Azerbaijan BIT, Art.
1 (2011) (excluding shareholdings below 10%).
169
Japan-Israel BIT, Arts. 1(a), 24(2).
168

2019

THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

33

arbitration. If she wins, she is clearly entitled to the winnings. She is thereby made whole. The
same holds for investors with covered contract or intellectual property rights. By contrast,
where the investment in question is a pool of stock or shares in a corporation, drawing
such a straight line between investment and ISDS proves quite problematic.
At least from the perspective of corporate law, basic questions about just what kind of suit
an investor-shareholder is entitled to bring are left totally unaddressed. Evidently, she is entitled to some kind of access to ISDS. But what kind of claim(s) can she bring? Can she bring
suit on her own behalf, for injuries to the company diminishing the value of her shares? Or may
she only bring suit on the company’s behalf? And who is entitled to recover damages—the
shareholder or the ﬁrm? The answers determine the relative strength of separate ownership,
as well as the contours of managerial authority over litigation. Separate personality thus turns
on these questions, making them fundamental to any system of corporate law. Yet they are
rarely addressed directly in treaty text, leaving their resolution to arbitral interpretation. What
is striking is that advanced national legal systems almost always answer these questions in one
way, for clear policy reasons, while ISDS tribunals invariably go in the opposite direction—
with little policy justiﬁcation.
Because shareholder standing cuts to the core of separate legal personality, corporate law
everywhere sharply distinguishes two kinds of shareholder claims. On the one hand, shareholders may bring “direct claims,” for injury to their shares (if, say, the government improperly forces an investor to sell her shares in a company). On the other hand, shareholders are
typically not permitted to bring claims for “shareholder reﬂective loss,” meaning claims based
on injury to the corporation causing incidental diminution in share value.170 In general, all
claims arising out of injury to the corporation must be vindicated by the corporation itself (in
management’s discretion). The only signiﬁcant exception is the shareholder derivative suit,
where shareholders can sometimes bring claims on behalf of the corporation against management’s wishes (typically requiring managerial conﬂict of interest), with any recovery going to
the ﬁrm.171
All advanced domestic systems of corporate law categorically reject shareholder reﬂective
loss suits,172 as do most international jurisdictions, including the International Court of
Justice173 and the European Court of Human Rights.174 However, as Gaukrodger explains,
the restriction of shareholder claims is rarely codiﬁed in statute or treaty.175 The doctrine is
instead usually judge-made, even in civil law countries. The main policy concern driving this
common judicial practice is that allowing direct shareholder recovery for reﬂective loss undermines entity shielding, and thus separate legal personality. Allowing reﬂective loss claims
170
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enables shareholders to siphon off recovery rightly belonging to the injured company (eroding
liquidation protection), and thereby jump ahead of creditors and other shareholders (circumventing creditor priority). It also enables shareholders to undermine centralized managerial
decision-making about litigation or settlement, and creates unfair risks of multiple claims and
double recovery.176
ISDS tribunals, by contrast, invariably interpret investment treaties as permitting shareholder reﬂective loss claims, with little explanation or analysis of why this follows from the
underlying treaties.177 They instead tend to assume that vague treaty text speaks for itself. In
Impregilo, for example, the Italian claimant-shareholder complained of Argentina’s actions
toward a local entity in which it had a controlling interest (AGBA). For the tribunal, it
was enough that the deﬁnition of investment in the Argentina—Italy BIT included stocks
and shares: “[If] AGBA was subjected to expropriation or unfair treatment with respect to
its concession . . . such action must also be considered to have affected Impregilo’s rights
as an investor, rights that were protected under the BIT.”178
Such a focus on the deﬁnition of investment apparently leads tribunals to assume that
shareholder claims are independent from the ﬁrm’s claims. This creates two further problematic corollaries. First, tribunals allow shareholders to recover directly in such suits, in proportion to their stake in the company. This effectively reverses the rule across national
jurisdictions that all recovery should go to the corporation itself. Second, this assumption
of independence opens the door to multiple parallel and/or sequential claims—by the company, by controlling shareholders, and/or by various minority shareholders.179 The effect is
exponentially compounded where the treaty also covers indirect equity.180
Although ISDS case law is remarkably well-settled on each of these points, it is not clear
that these conclusions necessarily follow from how investment treaties are drafted. Rather,
ISDS openness to claims of shareholder reﬂective loss reﬂects an interpretive choice.
Certainly, BIT coverage of stocks and shares is meant to have some effect. But most investment treaties do not address the scope of shareholder claims.181 That covering stocks and
shares as investments, without more, implies allowing shareholder reﬂective loss claims is certainly one possibility. But other less distortive interpretations are also reasonable. One
176
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approach would require that such claims be brought on behalf of the ﬁrm, with any recovery
going to company coffers. Another would be to limit shareholder claims to residual actions
where the corporation itself (i.e. management) is unable or unwilling to bring its own claim
for some inequitable reason. While the pro-shareholder reﬂective loss rule may ﬁt (relatively)
neatly with the text of most investment treaties, these texts do not unambiguously close off a
more calibrated approach. Nor is text everything. Indeed, even as a matter of formal treaty
interpretation, it is not clear why tribunals have given such short shrift to the position in general international law,182 or the uniformity across domestic jurisdictions.183 As in domestic
law, the scope and limits of shareholder suits reﬂect judicial choices. The difference is that,
in ISDS, tribunals have placed little emphasis on policy, relying more on (assumed) textual
mandate and arbitral precedent.
A small handful of treaties seem designed to limit shareholder claims, yet even here the pull
of ISDS precedents on reﬂective loss is apparent. The NAFTA, for example, includes stocks
and shares in the deﬁnition of investment,184 but distinguishes between two types of shareholder ISDS claims. Article 1116 covers claims by an investor “on its own behalf.” Article
1117, by contrast, permits an investor to bring a claim “on behalf of” a locally incorporated
enterprise that it “owns or controls, directly or indirectly”—essentially a form of derivative
action, where recovery goes to the company.185 Further, Article 1117(3) provides for presumptive joinder of 1116 and 1117 claims arising out of the same events. The NAFTA parties
have consistently argued that these provisions mirror the classic separation between direct and
derivative claims in domestic corporate law, with the intent of precluding shareholder reﬂective loss claims.186 But these provisions are not paragons of clarity. While some tribunals have

182
VCLT, Art. 31(3)(c) requires tribunals to take into account “other relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations among the parties,” which includes customary international law and general principles of law.
See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 279 (2005); Julian Arato, Constitutional Transformation in the ECtHR: Strasbourg’s Expansive
Recourse to External Rules of International Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349 (2012). Where tribunals have recognized
that general international law bars shareholder reﬂective loss claims, they have insisted that BITs are lex specialis. See
CMS Gas, Jurisdiction, para. 48; and Enron, Jurisdiction, para. 34. However, this argument still rests on an unstable assumption that BITs clearly authorize shareholder reﬂective loss as a matter of text, object and purpose, etc.
183
Such uniformity arguably indicates a general principle of international law. But see Teinver S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Jurisdiction, para. 212 (Dec. 21, 2012) (“refus[ing] to take their cues from
domestic corporate law”).
184
North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1139, entered into force Jan. 1, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
185
See also CPTPP, Arts. 9.19 (separating types of shareholder claims), 9.28 (incorporating joinder procedures);
CETA, Arts. 8.22 (extending waiver rules to cover both the foreign shareholder and a locally incorporated enterprise), and 8.43 (incorporating joinder procedures).
186
The NAFTA parties have also argued that permitting minority shareholders to bring shareholder reﬂective
loss claims under 1116 would render 1117 largely superﬂuous. See Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04,
Canadian Counter-Memorial on Damages, para. 26 (June 9, 2017) (allowing shareholder reﬂective loss “undermines one of the most fundamental rules of corporate law in all three NAFTA Parties. . . . [This] will weaken the
corporation’s separate legal personality, create unpredictability for investors, creditors, banks, and others who participate in the foreign direct investment market, create unfair conditions of competition among these different
sorts of investors, and hence, inevitably decrease the opportunities for investment in the NAFTA Parties.”);
GAMI v. Mexico, Submission of the United States, para. 17 (June 20, 2003); GAMI v. Mexico, Escrito de
Contestación of Mexico, para. 167 (Nov. 24, 2003).

36

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 113:1

viewed them as barring shareholder claims for reﬂective loss,187 others have permitted reﬂective loss claims under Article 1116.188
From his extensive review of the cases, Gaukrodger concludes that tribunals “have apparently considered it unnecessary to consider policy consequences in any detail because they
consider that the issue is resolved by the inclusion of shares in the investment deﬁnition
. . . [and by force of] arbitral precedent”—although the precedents themselves “rarely if
ever addressed the policy issues or consequences.”189 Yet it is worth considering whether
there might nevertheless be some policy justiﬁcation for allowing shareholder reﬂective loss
claims in ISDS that may be absent in domestic law. One seemingly compelling reason might
be to protect foreigners who invest through local entities, as discussed above. This does not,
however, require anything so radical as reversing the national rule against shareholder reﬂective loss claims. Various treaties incorporate provisions that would solve this problem more
directly, without contorting domestic corporate law. The NAFTA avoids this problem by providing for derivative suits.190 And many U.S. BITs resolve the issue by providing that a local
company can invoke ISDS as a constructive foreign investor if it would itself qualify as a covered investment under the treaty (by dint of foreign ownership).191 These treaties still cover
stocks and shares, and tribunals thus usually view them as permitting local company claims in
addition to claims for shareholder reﬂective loss.192 But these alternatives would sufﬁce, on
their own, to protect investors operating through local companies without sacriﬁcing major
features of corporate law, undercutting this possible rationale for allowing shareholder reﬂective loss claims.
Although neither necessitated by text, nor supported by any clear policy justiﬁcation, ISDS
openness to shareholder reﬂective loss has a strong distortive effect on national private law. By
allowing such shareholder claims, IIL displaces a keystone presumption of corporate law
wherever the relevant company is incorporated (home or host state), undermining foundational principles of the corporate form on which all constituencies rely. The ISDS approach
further contorts domestic corporate law by allowing such shareholders to recover directly,
bypassing the ﬁrm’s coffers; and by allowing the ﬁrm and its shareholders to bring multiple
independent, and even sequential, claims. Each of these moves reverses the position of the
ﬁrm under the domestic law of incorporation. IIL thereby tends to upset how that state’s
national law calibrates the rights, interests, and expectations of key corporate constituencies—shareholders, creditors, and management. Each of these distortions also strongly affects
the expectations of the host state more generally, in its interactions with the ﬁrm—both
adversarial (e.g. as a defendant) and cooperative (e.g. in trying to salvage an ongoing relationship, or settle a lawsuit).
187
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The obvious surface problem with ISDS openness to reﬂective loss claims concerns the
fairness of admitting multiple shareholder and/or corporate claims. Tribunals’ tendency to
view corporate claims and claims by discrete shareholders as completely independent raises
two specters: double recovery and multiple bites at the apple. Tribunals have proven sensitive
to the former, generally striving to limit shareholder recovery on a pro rata basis if and when
the arbitration reaches the damages phase. However, the latter concern has mostly fallen on
deaf ears.193 The problem is most vividly illustrated by the widely criticized awards in CME
and Lauder v. Czech Republic. These cases involved separate claims arising out of the same
injury to a local Czech company—by its 99 percent shareholder (CME) and by an indirect
minority shareholder (Lauder, who controlled CME).194 The two tribunals substantially
agreed on the admissibility of multiple separate shareholder suits. The respondent argued
that Lauder should be dismissed, because, to the extent that any damages were due, recovery
by CME would make all of its shareholders whole—including Mr. Lauder—while recovery
by the latter would leave the other shareholders in CME empty-handed.195 Both tribunals
disagreed, insisting that the claims were independent precisely because Lauder could not
be completely identiﬁed with CME.196 They then famously disagreed on the merits of essentially identical disputes: Lauder lost, while CME won an award in excess of $270 million.
The treatment of shareholder reﬂective loss in CME and Lauder is typical. This approach
gives investors little reason to forego successive bites at the apple beyond (substantial) cost—
especially in close cases. Beyond the manifest unfairness of allowing one party to “play ‘till you
win,” the ISDS approach also distorts incentives on all sides at the settlement stage, and facilitates opportunistic hold ups.
There have, however, been some recent signs that tribunals are becoming more sensitive to
these concerns—at least on the surface. A few have recognized that, in principle, it would be
abusive to allow an aggrieved investor to bring suit after failed suit, ad inﬁnitum. A handful
have drawn an outer limit based on complete identity of shares—barring separate claims by
shareholders and their wholly owned entities,197 or separate indirect and direct shareholder
claims over the exact same tranche of shares.198 However, this rule is not difﬁcult to work
around and does little to ward off opportunism.
The very recent award in Orascom v. Algeria goes further, explicitly questioning the continued relevance of Lauder/CME.199 In Orascom, the ultimate controlling shareholder had
both brought its own shareholder claim, and caused several subsidiary entities in the chain
to bring separate parallel claims under different BITs (including the local entity itself, the
direct shareholder, and several other intermediaries). Uncomfortable with permitting the
claimant so many shots, the tribunal invoked the equitable doctrine of “abuse of right”—
193
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holding that “an investor who controls several entities in a vertical chain of companies may
commit an abuse if it seeks to impugn the same host state measures and claims for the
same harm at various levels of the chain.”200 The investor may opt to take his bite through
any affected vehicle he controls, but he may not take more than one.201 Still, the tribunal
refused to foreclose the possibility of additional reﬂective loss claims by other non-controlling
shareholders (direct or indirect), viewing these as essentially independent.202 Thus, while
Orascom is a step in the right direction, it addresses only the surface problems of multiple
claims and double recovery, and these only partially.
The deeper structural harm in ISDS openness to shareholder reﬂective loss is that it hollows
the core tenets of entity-shielding: creditor priority and liquidation protection. Where the
corporation alone is entitled to bring suit to vindicate its interests, all recovery goes to the
company—to be distributed according to normal priority rules, and without abnormal risk
of liquidation by individual shareholders. But because ISDS entitles individual shareholders
to sue host states for reﬂective loss and recover directly, the covered shareholder-investor is
empowered to jump the line (undermining priority rules), and to siphon off assets rightfully
belonging to the corporation as a whole (undermining liquidation protection). This move
undermines the signal feature of separate legal personality, with consequences ex post (e.g.,
for the insulation and/or equitable distribution of corporate assets) and ex ante (e.g., for
the availability and price of credit).203
The extent to which ISDS distorts national law on entity shielding is especially stark where
the ﬁrm is in distress—in the zone of bankruptcy, or in actual bankruptcy proceedings. As
Gaukrodger puts it, usually “[shareholder reﬂective loss] intervenes at a moment when the
company is already weakened. What is at issue is the company’s capacity to reconstitute its
assets and expectations about that capacity.”204
Assume, for simplicity, that a foreign-owned ﬁrm’s value as a going concern is destroyed due
to host state mistreatment. The business may need to be wound down, irrespective of any
potential recovery from the state. In such circumstances, there may not be enough assets to
satisfy the ﬁrm’s creditors and shareholders. National corporate law guarantees creditors priority on these assets. If the business gets wound down, all funds (including any recovery in
pending litigation) get paid out to the ﬁrm’s creditors ﬁrst, and distributed pro rata among
shareholders only thereafter.205 Creditors depend on this priority rule, and it is a key factor
in the availability (and price) of credit ex ante.206 ISDS, however, allows particular (treaty-protected) shareholders to recover immediately, reducing the total asset pool available for distribution to all other corporate constituencies. Even if the tribunal reduces the investor’s recovery
in proportion to her shares, there may not be enough left to satisfy the ﬁrm’s creditors (who
200
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normally expect priority), or appropriately compensate other shareholders (who expect parity). Moreover, allowing a shareholder to recover directly enables her to siphon value from the
ﬁrm, potentially undercutting its capacity to reconstitute itself as a going concern. Thus, the
ISDS rule distorts both aspects of entity shielding (creditor priority and liquidation protection), with the effect of subverting the normal expectations of creditors and shareholders
(as a class) set by the domestic law of the corporation (be that host state law or home state law).
Although less glaring, the ISDS rule also undermines core features of the corporate form
even for ﬁrms not in distress. It allows shareholders to second-guess fundamental managerial
decisions on whether to initiate litigation, how to pursue lawsuits, and whether to settle.207
Investment disputes can (and often should) be resolved through consultation and compromise, rather than litigation. But the specter of separate shareholder claims substantially weakens the company’s hand, and should diminish a rational state’s conﬁdence that any agreement
with management will ultimately stick. This further undermines the foundations of separate
legal personality (weakening the ﬁrm’s ability to serve as a single contracting party, and to sue
in its own name) as well as the principle of delegated management.208
In perforating separate legal personality, ISDS creates substantial inefﬁciencies. Ex post, the
rule creates incentives for covered shareholders to act opportunistically, especially where ﬁrms
are in distress. This harms creditors, other shareholders, and the ﬁrm itself. Even among
treaty-covered shareholders, it creates perverse ﬁrst-mover incentives, with obvious harm
for states stuck defending multiple claims. And it weakens the hand of management in its
interaction with the state at critical moments. All these effects are further likely to produce
ex ante problems over the long term. IIL, as interpreted, forces creditors to account for the
dearth of typical priority and liquidation protections when considering whether to fund foreign direct investment projects—a problem drastically exacerbated by the possibility of reﬂective loss claims by indirect investors. By imposing additional risks and costs, this rule pushes
creditors to either reduce the availability of credit, or increase its price—affecting the overall
cost of capital either way.209
In sum, based solely on the fact that investment treaties cover stocks and shares as investments, without clarifying the scope of investor standing vis-à-vis such investments, ISDS tribunals have inferred that shareholder-investors enjoy the same procedural rights as any other
investors. They have thus allowed shareholder claims for reﬂective loss without much considering the vast policy considerations at stake.210 This position deviates from, and displaces, the
rule universally adopted by advanced national corporate laws, as well as general international
law. More fundamentally, IIL here afﬁrmatively distorts the domestic corporate laws of all
parties to the investment treaty, undermining key features of the corporate form for any
ﬁrm involved in foreign direct investment. These distortions have harmful spillover effects
for the ﬁrm itself, as well as inside and outside constituencies, both ex post (incentivizing multiple bites at the apple and shareholder opportunism), and ex ante (diminishing managerial
authority and the availability of credit).211
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2. Agency and Apparent Authority
IIL and ISDS also distort the ﬁrm’s capacity to contract as a single entity—another hallmark of separate legal personality—by creating unnecessary questions about apparent authority. This capacity turns on dedicated background rules articulating the authority of agents to
tie the ﬁrm’s hands. “Rules governing the allocation of authority are needed to establish common expectations as to who has authority to transfer rights relating to corporate assets prior to
entering into a contract for their transfer.”212 For most matters, mere default rules sufﬁce.
Corporate law generally leaves ﬁrms signiﬁcant leeway to decide internally how actual authority is delegated—in its articles of incorporation, or bylaws. However, the law must provide
ﬁrmer guidance regarding apparent authority, upon which third parties can rely. Otherwise,
parties wishing to deal with the ﬁrm would face oppressive and wasteful costs to discover
whether ofﬁcers indeed possess the authority to transact in the ﬁrm’s name.213 This, in
turn, would open the door to undue opportunism on the part of the ﬁrm and its agents.
Corporate law everywhere thus provides minimal rules delineating apparent authority, or
some functional equivalent, and generally makes them mandatory.214
ISDS muddies the apparent authority analysis.215 Questions of authority come up frequently in ISDS—sometimes regarding agents of the host state216 or state-owned entities,
and sometimes regarding the investor’s corporate agents.217 Investment treaties generally
say nothing on the subject, leaving it to tribunals to resolve such issues. Here, as with contracts, the absence of clear rules creates substantial uncertainty: Is the question of authority
governed by national law? If so, which national law? And, if not, on what basis will tribunals
decide such questions?
Given the strong policy rationale favoring clear rules of apparent authority, one would
expect a tribunal to simply rely on national law to resolve the issue, following conﬂict of
laws principles—or at least articulate its own “crystalline” rules-based approach upon
which states and putative investors could theoretically rely ex ante.218 The case law on
point is still sparse. Yet at least one tribunal eschewed a rules-based approach to apparent
authority entirely, instead resolving the issue through muddy ex post equitable balancing—
creating signiﬁcant uncertainty and revealing yet another way in which ISDS can distort the
corporate form.
In Getma v. Guinea, four related claimant companies brought an ICSID claim over the
state’s termination of a concession contract to develop and operate a container terminal in
212
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the Port of Conkary.219 One entity (NCT Necotrans) wholly owned the other three subsidiaries (including Getma). The preliminary issue was whether the claimants had waived ICSID
jurisdiction. The concession agreement, formally executed between Getma and Guinea, contained an arbitration clause that selected the Common Court of Justice (CCJA) of the
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). In the tribunal’s
view, this clause served to waive ICSID jurisdiction under the Guinean Investment Law,
which provided standing consent to arbitrate at ICSID absent a “contrary agreement” to
arbitrate elsewhere.220 Since Getma had actually signed the contract, its access to ICSID
was foreclosed. The key issue was whether the other three claimants, not parties to the
contract, were nevertheless constructively bound by the waiver.221
Guinea claimed that the non-signatories should be bound on a “group of companies” theory, allowing extending an arbitration agreement with a subsidiary to its non-signatory parent
(and other related companies) under certain conditions.222 Functionally, this doctrine should
be understood under the rubric of apparent authority—as a means of protecting third parties
who believe they are negotiating with the broader group.223 Guinea argued that the doctrine
applied as a substantive principle of international arbitration applicable in OHADA law.224
The claimants denied that any such doctrine applied, being neither clearly established in
many domestic legal orders, nor in ICSID case law,225 and being in any event inapposite
on the facts.226
Given the parties’ views on the matter, one might have expected the tribunal to deal with
three questions to determine the applicable rules of apparent authority here: Does the group
of companies theory apply? If so, does it bind the non-signatory claimants to Getma’s
219
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contractual waiver of ICSID jurisdiction? And if not, might some other rules of apparent
authority bind the non-signatories?227 Yet, with no explanation, the tribunal skated past
any rules-based analysis, opting instead to resolve the issue through impressionistic balancing.
The tribunal ﬁrst carefully examined whether Getma might have had actual authority to
bind the other members of the group. Confusingly, the same individuals who served as executives of the subsidiaries also served as executives or board members of the parent—meaning
that the same individuals might have authority to speak for each entity.228 The tribunal
rightly held that actual authority would turn on whether those ofﬁcers were acting on behalf
of Getma or the other entities in negotiating and signing the concession agreement—and
found that they were indeed only acting as Getma’s agents.229
The more difﬁcult question was whether these companies could be bound to the concession under a theory of apparent authority. Obviously, the investors’ group structure could
create confusion in the negotiating process. So the question was whether some rule of apparent authority entitled Guinea to understand that it was negotiating with the corporate group
as a whole. Here the tribunal opted to resolve things on its own, through muddy ex post equitable review. It rejected Guinea’s proposed theory of corporate groups out of hand—without
reference to any particular applicable law or policy.230 Instead, the tribunal declared that
“[t]hird parties are obliged to recognize the proper identity of each company, unless the companies themselves do not respect it and create confusion about the subject.”231 However, the
tribunal emphasized that these companies each had a deﬁned, constitutive role in the investment project, and that Getma was negotiating through individuals who also served as ofﬁcers
of the other companies. In the tribunal’s view, the claimants should have known that Guinea
might derive reasonable assurances from these facts.232 Thus it held the non-signatories to the
concession agreement’s waiver of ICSID jurisdiction.233
Viewed in isolation, the tribunal’s analysis seems reasonable enough. It seemed to reject a
broad group of companies doctrine, in favor of a more stringent theory of apparent authority,
wherein one member of a corporate group might bind the others without actual authority if
the companies were all active participants in the investment, and their conduct was likely to
create substantial confusion about the distinctions among them. This would be a perfectly
reasonable approach, closer to the U.S. alter ego approach than the French doctrine of groupes
des sociétés,234 and this is not the place to debate which would be normatively preferable. The
distortion arises from the fact that the tribunal did not inquire into the applicable law at all—
in a context where crystalline clarity serves a crucial function of protecting third parties. The
227
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tribunal rather engaged in a wholly de novo analysis, neither grounded in any national or international law, nor adequately speciﬁed in its contours.
The corporate form requires clear and immutable rules on apparent authority. Their
absence engenders perverse incentives for ﬁrms to behave opportunistically and forces
third parties to engage in excessive due diligence. Even mere confusion about the rules drives
up the cost of doing business. Though the Getma tribunal came to a reasonable enough ex post
result, its rough justice analysis does little to foster conﬁdence in the content of apparent
authority ex ante. Under this muddy approach, ISDS displaces otherwise applicable national
law solutions without offering a reasonably secure alternative. This further distorts the capacity of the ﬁrm to serve as a single contracting party, which depends on outsiders having conﬁdence in the rules of engagement. What the tribunal should have done instead—and future
tribunals ought to do—is rely on national apparent authority rules, determined on the basis of
conﬂict of laws analysis.235 Failing that, the Getma tribunal should have at least articulated a
rules-based approach on which future arbitrators might rely—even given the perennial institutional deﬁciencies of ISDS.
3. Distorting the Corporate Form
In extending their coverage to enterprises, as well as stocks and shares, investment treaties
materially create international corporate law. However, they do so only implicitly and vaguely.
ISDS has tended to interpret the treaties in ways that displace keystone principles of domestic
corporate law, and distort the corporate form. In particular, the patterns of interpretation undercut the corporation’s separate legal personality, undermining each of its three core features. By
upending the domestic bar on shareholder reﬂective loss suits, ISDS provides an end run around
separate ownership (by weakening entity shielding and liquidation protection). It further allows
shareholders to second-guess managerial authority over litigation, watering down the ﬁrm’s
capacity to sue on its own behalf (not to mention delegated management) with efﬁciency
costs for insiders and third parties. And ﬁnally, by muddying the waters on apparent authority,
ISDS erodes the ﬁrm’s capacity to contract in its own name, creating unnecessary due diligence
costs for all who engage with ﬁrms involved in foreign direct investment.
These problems adequately illustrate the distortive potential of ISDS vis-à-vis national corporate law. Yet other instances abound. Another example, which I explore in greater detail
elsewhere, regularly arises when tribunals have to decide under what circumstances it would
be appropriate to “look through” a corporation (“veil piercing”)—for such different questions
as determining corporate nationality, or attributing acts of a state-owned corporation to the
host state.236 Here the reverse problem arises. Rather than ignoring domestic law, tribunals
have typically overemphasized domestic analogies—leaning on an inapposite presumption
against veil piercing derived from the very different context of limited shareholder liability,
without considering the different interests and values at stake across these varied situations.237
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Lastly, it is worth noting that the distortions of contract and corporate law compound one
another. One extreme result has been to render the terms of a bargained-for state contract
effectively optional for a foreign investor operating through a business corporation.238 This
perverse result arises because IIL and ISDS simultaneously (1) make treaty rules mandatory,
and (2) allow ﬁrms to shop for treaty protection after executing their contracts (by granting
rights of standing to indirect shareholders).239 As a result, a ﬁrm can contract with a state in
the absence of any investment treaty, and unilaterally alter the terms of the deal in its favor by
restructuring for BIT protection ex post, without even notifying the host state.240 This situation creates excessive due diligence costs for states party to even a single investment treaty, as
well as signiﬁcant risks of unfair, surprise constraints on their freedom of action.
At the same time, the mandatory approach to contracts might undercut potential private
ordering solutions to ISDS’ distortions of the corporate form. Korzun has suggested, for
example, that ﬁrms might restrict shareholder access to ISDS in corporate charters or
bylaws.241 Firms should be able to do this. But the current contracts jurisprudence leaves
open to serious doubt whether an ISDS tribunal would give this innovative solution any
effect.
D. Intellectual Property as a Limited Case for Optimism
Tribunals have tended to fare better in the few decided cases involving intellectual property
claims, with greater sensitivity to the discrete functions of patent and trademark protection.
Intellectual property refers to a group of loosely related bundles of intangible rights to control
the products of human innovation and creativity.242 The major forms involve ownership
rights over inventions (patent), expressions (copyright), and brand names or signs (trademark). This is not the place to delve deeply into these categories. Sufﬁce it to say that each
reﬂects a bargain between society and innovators: under certain circumstances, the state protects knowledge-based goods with the goal of encouraging socially beneﬁcial innovation.
Such protections are always limited in scope, and often in duration. They are typically framed
around exclusive rights—private monopolies that allow owners to challenge infringing conduct by other private actors. And intellectual property rights typically involve only limited
protection against the state as regulator.
The various intellectual property categories each involve different values and tradeoffs. For
example, patent seeks to incentivize costly research and development by limiting third party
free-riding after the utility (and value) of an invention is established. One glaring tradeoff is
that such private monopolies may keep prices high for important consumer goods like medicines. Trademark, by contrast, enables a business to protect the goodwill it generates by preventing others from trading off its name—but might make it difﬁcult for new, potentially
innovative ﬁrms to dislodge established market players. Different types of intellectual
indirectly invoke ISDS against their own state of nationality under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, via a 99% owned
Lithuanian holding company).
238
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property protection pursue different interests and values, and in no case is there a perfect balance among the relevant tradeoffs. Nations unsurprisingly differ in what priorities they pursue
in their intellectual property regimes.
However, unlike with property and contract, there is a broad ﬁeld of international intellectual property law, comprised of major multilateral treaties and institutions,243 and regional
agreements. Indeed, most national legal systems have committed internationally to harmonize a common core of patent, copyright, and trademark rights. Still, countries exhibit considerable variation in how far they go beyond these minimums and how they interpret them.
And some still refrain from signing on to particular intellectual property treaties in the ﬁrst
place.244
The ISDS cases decided thus far have not upended this ecology—neither distorting
national nor international intellectual property law, nor, mostly, the balance between
them.245 This does not mean that the investment treaty regime has had no distortive effects.
It is difﬁcult to know how far the mere threat of ISDS has pushed states to preemptively distort
the regulatory balance in favor of foreign intellectual property owners. And some large investors have pursued strategies of intense pressure under the shadow of litigation—sometimes
successfully.246 Still, from a private law perspective, the few merits awards in intellectual
property cases light the path toward a better approach.
1. The State of the Field: Trademark and Patent
Of the handful of ISDS merits-awards based on intellectual property investments, the most
prominent are Philip Morris v. Uruguay and Eli Lilly v. Canada.247 In each case, the tribunal
proved sensitive to the particularities of the intellectual property rights comprising the
investment—trademarks and patents, respectively.248 Rather than treat all covered
investments as an undifferentiated pool, both tribunals started from the sensible assumption
243
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that any expropriation or fair and equitable treatment analysis would have to begin with an
appreciation of the scope and meaning of those rights alleged to have been taken.
Philip Morris v. Uruguay involved a dispute over restrictions on cigarette packaging, which
the investor alleged to have vitiated the value of several of its brands—in violation of treaty
provisions on expropriation and fair and equitable treatment (among others). The investor
had registered several trademarks in Uruguay, grouped into several brands (e.g., Marlboro,
Casino, and Fiesta), each including several “variants” (e.g., Marlboro Red, Marlboro Gold,
and Marlboro Fresh Mint). The dispute arose out of two Uruguayan measures designed to
limit tobacco consumption. One limited brand presentation to 20 percent of any cigarette
package (the 80/80 regulation). The other barred companies from subdividing brands to prevent misleading consumers into thinking that some variants posed lower health risks (the
Single Presentation Regulation)—effectively forcing the investor to choose one variant and
refrain from marketing the others.249 The clear goal of both measures was to mitigate consumer misinformation about the serious health risks associated with smoking. There was no
dispute that trademarks were covered as investments under the BIT. The case turned on
whether Uruguay had violated the treaty in regulating how the investor used its marks (the
80/80 regulation), and by completely restricting the use of several of its variant marks (Single
Presentation).
The tribunal rightly began by inquiring into the exact nature of trademark rights under
Uruguayan law. Acknowledging that the governing law of the dispute was the BIT (and
other applicable international law), the tribunal nevertheless explained that the treaty
could not be applied in the abstract. Any expropriation or fair and equitable treatment
claim must start with that which was alleged to have been taken—an investment, the
scope and contents of which are determined, in the ﬁrst cut, by national law.250 Thus
“[t]he central issue over the trademarks is what rights a registered trademark accords its
owner under Uruguayan law.”251 Speciﬁcally, the case turned on whether Uruguayan trademarks entailed absolute use rights or merely exclusive rights. The ﬁrst would entail an afﬁrmative right to use the trademarks in any way the investor wished, free from restriction by
government or encroachment by others. The latter would entail more limited rights to
exclude others from using the marks, or confusingly similar ones, without guaranteeing
that the owner would be free to use the mark herself.
The claimant attempted to muddy the waters by arguing that “trademarks are a form of
property” like any other, “and that all property owners have the right to use their property”
under the Uruguayan Constitution.252 However, the tribunal rightly agreed with the respondent that Uruguayan law distinguishes between tangible and intellectual property, and that
the scope of the investor’s rights could only be determined in light of Uruguayan trademark
law.253 Reviewing Uruguay’s intellectual property statutes and international intellectual
property commitments, the tribunal held that the Uruguayan trademarks entailed merely
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exclusive rights, with no “absolute right to use that can be asserted against the state qua
regulator.”254
The question, then, was whether Uruguay’s regulatory measures expropriated, or otherwise
interfered with, the investor’s exclusive rights. The tribunal found that neither constituted an
expropriation, which would require a substantial deprivation of the asset. The 80/80 regulation did not deprive the investor of its marks at all, merely limiting the size of their presentation. The Single Presentation Requirement was more difﬁcult, because it prevented Philip
Morris from using some of its trademarks entirely, forcing it to pick one variant per brand and
let other trademarked variants lie fallow. However, the tribunal refused to examine the trademarks one by one, instead ﬁnding that they comprised a single investment for purposes of an
expropriation analysis, and that there had been no substantial deprivation of that investment
as a whole.255 And in any case, neither measure in any way impaired the investor’s right to
exclude third parties from using its marks.
The tribunal also found that there was no violation of fair and equitable treatment. In its
view, the state was entitled to “great deference” in fair and equitable treatment claims when
regulating matters like public health in good faith. Again emphasizing that the investors’
rights were limited to exclusion, not use, it found that the measures were not sufﬁciently egregious as to breach the treaty.256
[C]hanges to general legislation (at least in the absence of a stabilization clause) are not
prevented by the fair and equitable treatment standard if they do not exceed the exercise
of the host State’s normal regulatory power in the pursuance of a public interest and do
not modify the regulatory framework relied upon by the investor at the time of its investment “outside of the acceptable margin of change.”257
In the tribunal’s view, the investor could not draw from general Uruguayan law a legitimate
expectation that its trademarks would not be subject to future regulation (though, notably, as
in Parkerings, it could have ratcheted up the level of treaty protection by contract).258
From a private law perspective, Philip Morris v. Uruguay admirably keeps property, intellectual property, and contract separate—despite their undifferentiated inclusion under the
treaty deﬁnition of investment. For the tribunal, the extension of treaty standards to intellectual property rights turns on the content of those rights under national law, and must not be
confused with other forms of property. And should an investor wish for heightened protections, she is free to bargain with the state for a contractual stabilization clause.
The award in Eli Lilly v. Canada is similarly encouraging. At issue there was the Canadian
courts’ invalidation of two of the claimant’s patents for medications. The courts voided the
patents on the basis of a common law “promise utility doctrine.”259 Canadian patent law, like
that of other jurisdictions, requires that a patent be both novel and useful. The promise utility
doctrine represented a relatively restrictive version of the usefulness prong, requiring that any
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invention actually turn out to have the utility that the ﬁler claimed it would. The doctrine also
foreclosed owners from developing post-ﬁling evidence of utility or ﬁnding new potential uses
for the invention to justify the original patent. The claimant alleged that the promise utility
doctrine was a new creation by the courts—one that radically departed from the much more
lenient regime in force when the patents were actually ﬁled. Eli Lilly thus claimed that the
retroactive application of this doctrine to invalidate its patents constituted an expropriation
and a breach of legitimate expectations.260
The tribunal sided with Canada on most fronts, mostly limiting its discussion to dismissing
the “factual predicate” of the investor’s case: that the promise utility doctrine represented a
radical transformation of Canadian common law.261 Most importantly for present purposes,
the tribunal focused on the meaning of the claimant’s rights under national law, and considered any expectations to which these patents might give rise only in the context of the intellectual property regime under which they were actually granted. Noting that Canada is a
common law system, the tribunal emphasized that “evolution of the law through court decisions is natural, and departures from precedent are to be expected,”262 and that “although
[the] Claimant may not have been able to predict the precise trajectory of the law on utility,
it should have, and could have, anticipated that the law would change over time as a function
of judicial decision-making.”263 The tribunal also found that the promise utility doctrine
emerged incrementally, with roots predating Eli Lilly’s patents, thus upending the factual premise on which the claimant hung its hat.264
Finally, timing aside, the tribunal examined whether the Canadian patent doctrine could
be described as arbitrary on its face. Stressing that the measures in question were judicial rulings, the tribunal deferred mightily to both the courts’ interpretations of their own domestic
law and their policy considerations, applying a highly deferential “rational connection”
test.265 It found that Canada had a “legitimate public policy justiﬁcation” for the promise
utility doctrine, in that it “helps ensure that ‘the public receives its end of the patent bargain’
. . . and that it ‘encourages accuracy while discouraging overstatement in patent disclosures.’”266 The tribunal found that it “need not opine on whether the promise doctrine is
the only, or the best, means of achieving these objectives.”267 It sufﬁced that the “doctrine
is rationally connected to these legitimate policy goals . . . [and] it is not the role of a NAFTA
Chapter Eleven tribunal to question the policy choices of a NAFTA Party.”268
In both of the major intellectual property cases decided thus far, the tribunals proved
uncommonly sensitive to domestic private law. From a private law perspective, these cases
provide a model for engaging with the varied rights and assets covered by investment treaties.
The analyses in both Philip Morris and Eli Lilly started from an appreciation of the rights
260

Id.
Id., para. 351.
262
Id., para. 310.
263
Id., para. 384.
264
Id., para. 386.
265
Id., para. 423.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id., paras. 423–26 (“All patent regimes must determine the line between speculation and invention . . . there
is no perfect place to draw this line.”).
261

2019

THE PRIVATE LAW CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

49

comprising the investment, in their proper national legal context. Both tribunals proved
highly sensitive to the discrete functions and logic of intellectual property protection, as
against other kinds of assets. And each proved admirably deferential to the states’ own policy
choices undergirding their intellectual property regimes. In both instances, then, IIL and
ISDS served as an additional layer of protection for the investor’s intellectual property rights,
without meaningfully distorting national (or international) intellectual property law.
2. Intellectual Property Is Not Inoculated
There is nothing about intellectual property law that insulates it from the distortive effects
marking ISDS jurisprudence on contracts or corporate law. One can only speculate about the
greater sensitivity to national private law in Philip Morris and Eli Lilly. On the one hand, intellectual property may be a special case. The existence of a robust ﬁeld of international intellectual property law may have played an important role, allowing the tribunals to “check”
domestic intellectual property solutions against what might have appeared more neutral international comparators. It is certainly plausible that these tribunals were more comfortable relying on domestic law to determine the scope of the rights involved because the domestic laws in
question comport, more or less closely, with international standards. It may also be that tribunals are more comfortable with the rigid logic of standardization pervading both intellectual property and classical property—the world of forms, by contrast to contract and
corporate law, which belong, to varying degrees, to the world of choice.
On the other hand, one might explain the cases by reference to contingent factors: their
recent vintage, their exceptionally high proﬁle, or the particular arbitrators involved.269 Also
potentially relevant is the longstanding political salience of disputes over the scope of intellectual property protection in international law and politics.270 Or even more simply, the difference here may just be that the litigants framed these cases around the contours of the
domestic intellectual property rights in question.
Whatever the explanation, what is important is that the greater sensitivity of ISDS to the
logic and functions of intellectual property cannot be taken as a guarantee. The intellectual
property cases do give some cause for cautious optimism. More importantly, they provide a
roadmap for how tribunals ought to approach all kinds of private legal rights. But given the
diffuse nature of the ISDS regime, the structural risk of distortion remains—both in future
cases, and informally, through investor pressure under the shadow of litigation.271 Though a
handful of cases have come out the right way, it behooves states to consider addressing the
speciﬁcity of intellectual property at the treaty level.
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IV. CONCLUSION: PRIVATE LAW AND REFORM
From a private law perspective, IIL and ISDS have become unjustiﬁable and increasingly
unsustainable. I have argued that investment treaties have quietly established broad ﬁelds of
international private law—including discrete laws of property, contract, corporations, and
intellectual property. This metamorphosis has taken place through a troubling dynamic in
the interpretation of thousands of similarly drafted BITs and FTA investment chapters.
The treaties typically cover all kinds of private commercial rights as “assets,” without differentiating as to how their substantive and procedural guarantees interact with such varied legal
arrangements. Called to interpret the relationship between treaty rights and these myriad
commercial assets, ISDS tribunals have mostly followed a one-size-ﬁts-all model, reﬂecting
an assumed real property logic—even though this logic makes little sense as applied to nonproperty assets. As a result, IIL and ISDS have together generated rudimentary, but surprisingly broad, swathes of international private law—disciplining domestic policy space in
underappreciated ways, and distorting the logic and functions of whole ﬁelds of domestic private law in relation to foreign investors. Not only do these distortions create unfair ex post
constraints and surprise costs for states seeking to regulate in the public interest (the typical
public law complaint), they also make investment more difﬁcult, costly, and unappealing for
all parties ex ante.
The most signiﬁcant distortions have thus far arisen in the world of choice—especially in
the context of contracts and corporate law. ISDS tribunals have tended to blur the logics of
contract and property—limiting states’ and investors’ capacity to bargain for terms they prefer, and instead mandating highly investor-friendly terms which are unlikely to prove efﬁcient
under all circumstances. At the same time, tribunals have prevented states from regulating
choice where they deem it appropriate in the interest of extrinsic values (like policing public
corruption). In so doing, ISDS has turned contract law on its head, undercutting its empowering, gap-ﬁlling, and regulatory functions. True, a few tribunals have exhibited a greater
appreciation for the logic of contract. But given the institutional fragmentation of the investment treaty regime, even uncertainty over the prospective effects of contractual choices creates substantial inefﬁciencies for bargaining ex ante.
Similarly the case law has tended to distort the logic and functions of corporate law. By permitting shareholders to directly sue host states for reﬂective loss, ISDS perforates the ﬁrm’s
separate legal personality, undercutting the expectations of all corporate constituencies (management, shareholders, creditors, and governments). All this affects the cost and availability of
credit for foreign direct investment projects, and creates more long-term uncertainty than it
cures. It further diminishes managerial authority over fundamental questions of litigation and
settlement. IIL and ISDS have also proven capable of muddying rules of agency and authority,
creating substantial uncertainty over who speaks for the ﬁrm in a cross-border context, and
undermining the ﬁrm’s ability to transact in its own name. This generates uncertainty for
states contracting with foreign ﬁrms, as well as investors contracting with state-owned entities.
All these distortions undercut core features of the corporate form, diminishing the corporation’s signal value as an efﬁcient vehicle for coordinating capital in the context of foreign direct
investment. And similar concerns arise for other forms of business organization.
Happily, the cases have not tended to distort real property or intellectual property. Thus far
tribunals have proven more comfortable with the world of forms than the world of choice. Yet
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there is little reason to assume these regimes will remain insulated from the kinds of problems
of differentiation and ﬁt marking the jurisprudence on contracts and corporations.
Particularly in the case of intellectual property, the few landmark cases decided thus far
may prove to be outliers, akin to the handful of better reasoned decisions grappling with contracts or corporations. And even now, investors can and do exploit the vagaries of the limited
intellectual property jurisprudence to informally inﬂate their intellectual property rights
beyond what is purportedly afforded in national law. The shadow of ISDS litigation is
long indeed.
From a private law perspective, then, it appears that ISDS case law has tended to undermine the very values of predictability, stability, and investment promotion that investment
treaties are designed to secure—ballooning transaction costs for all parties for no good reason.
Even given the most optimistic assumptions about market rationality and information available to states and investors, the tradeoffs posed by prevailing interpretations of investment
treaties produce perverse results. If adequately understood and priced in by all concerned parties, these distortions are likely to raise the cost of doing business for states and investors ex
ante—particularly to the extent that they cannot be bargained around. And on more realistic
assumptions about the (bounded) rationality of these actors, the regime is all the more likely
to impose one-sided surprise costs on host states ex post.
The private law critique thus calls attention to myriad problems with the investment treaty
regime that the public law approach has generally missed, and even tends to obscure.
Moreover, this frame further shows that many of these problems are lose-lose—affecting
not only host states (the primary locus of concern for the public lawyers), but also investors,
home states, and third parties (including corporate creditors, and non-litigious shareholders).
From this vantage point, IIL and ISDS not only undercut equitable distribution and fairness
for states. Counterintuitively, they also undercut IIL’s own primary values—legal predictability and stability, in the service of promoting efﬁcient foreign direct investment.
Given these pathologies, it remains to consider whether states are doing anything to reform
the private dimensions of the regime, and, if not, to begin thinking about what might be
done. As noted at the outset, IIL is at an inﬂection point, with states of all stripes invested
in a wide range of reform projects. Yet, while important, the major ongoing reform projects
have mostly missed the kinds of private law pathologies identiﬁed here. A good part of the
problem appears to be that these programs are typically framed in public law terms by both
scholars and key reform-minded government actors272—something this Article seeks to
redress.
This one-sided public law approach is particularly evident in the unilateral and bilateral
efforts toward reforming substantive investment treaty norms since 2010, where the focus
has been on including general exceptions clauses or limiting the ambit of particular substantive treaty standards. Although such reforms can alleviate ISDS’ sting, they do little to differentiate between the various species of covered rights and assets, or to cure IIL’s distortion of
national private law.
Still, there have been some small-scale signs for optimism in recent treaty practice, indicating
that some states are beginning to recognize the private law dimensions and pathologies of IIL—at
least on a piecemeal basis. A few recently adopted treaties contain differentiated rules for how
272
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substantive treaty standards apply to particular types of investment. For example, the Japanese
and Canadian BITs generally set special rules for intellectual property claims, clarifying, inter
alia, that they do not expand substantive intellectual property protection beyond the bargain
reached in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.273 Similarly, a handful of treaties incorporate special
rules for some state contracts under the rubric of “investment agreements,” adding greater clarity
about the relationship between national and international law.274 And a few treaties have hesitantly sought to limit the scope of indirect shareholder claims, by introducing minimal equity
requirements.275 The 2018 amendments to the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)
are a rare example where states have gone further to address the reﬂective loss problem, by mostly
closing off the possibility of multiple claims by parents and subsidiaries.276 Although these
reforms rarely go far toward redressing the problems identiﬁed here, they at least hint at their
growing salience.
States could go much further, however, by adopting relatively simple treaty design solutions. For example, with respect to the logic of contract, treaties could explicitly indicate that
investors and states are free to contract around substantive or procedural treaty terms. As
noted above, the CISG does exactly this for sales contracts with a single concise sentence.277
Not only would this promote efﬁcient bargaining for both states and investors, it would also
empower states to control risks posed by IIL and ISDS to their regulatory autonomy directly,
within their contractual relationships. States might also demarcate certain norms as expressly
mandatory, or even as sticky defaults with speciﬁc rules on how to make opt-out effective.
Any express language in this regard would be a substantial boon from the perspective of predictability and efﬁciency, for both states and investors. Similarly, treaties might include relatively simple provisions to eliminate or defang the perverse consequences of shareholder
reﬂective loss claims—for example by requiring that all recovery go presumptively to the
ﬁrm (not the shareholder). And with respect to intellectual property and classical property,
drafters might take a page from the intellectual property cases to clarify that the scope of such
rights turns, primarily, on national law. These examples are just illustrative of the range of
drafting possibilities available.
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Treaty reform of this sort is difﬁcult to accomplish, due to the sheer number of treaties
involved. But given the structural weakness of ISDS as a jurisprudential system, treaty design
is likely to be a more fruitful and lasting strategy than waiting for tribunals to start getting it
right. Given adequate substantive treaty reforms, IIL might serve as a complement to domestic private law, rather than a distortive interloper.
Although a heavier political lift, the broader multilateral efforts at reforming ISDS also give
cause for optimism, and provide a rare window of opportunity. Here too, the efforts at
UNCITRAL and elsewhere have tended to be cast in public law terms, with nary a mention
of the tradeoffs between ISDS and domestic private law. Yet some of these projects may nevertheless ameliorate the latter concerns. For example, a systematic multilateral investment
court (or appellate mechanism) could mitigate the scourge of uncertainty over the treaty/contract relationship. Depending on design choices, it might also remove incentives for investors
to bring parallel shareholder claims (through strong provisions on res judicata, lis pendens, and
mandatory joinder).278 In this sense, the investment court project might prove highly desirable from a private law perspective, even though it is rarely justiﬁed in those terms.279
However, institutional reform is not a panacea, and could perversely lead to entrenching
the distortions of the current jurisprudence instead of removing them—for example, by
adopting an inefﬁciently rigid approach to the treaty/contract question, or endorsing shareholder reﬂective loss claims. Important as they are, institutional and procedural reforms must
be accompanied by substantive treaty reform, whether bilateral or multilateral.
The private law frame reveals substantial pathologies in the investment treaty jurisprudence. IIL distorts domestic private law policy space, as much or more than it undercuts
the state’s general regulatory autonomy. These problems need to be addressed—not just
by litigants and arbitrators, but, much more importantly, by states themselves in designing
the next wave of investment treaties. This does not mean that the solutions are necessarily to
be found in analogies to domestic private law as opposed to public law, as a magic key to
unlocking IIL’s optimal tradeoffs. The point is rather that these heuristics are most useful
in what they reveal, not in what they prescribe. What is needed, then, is a project of treaty
reform sensitive to the pathologies of IIL vis-à-vis both public and private law—a project for
which this critique simply lays the groundwork.
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